Trust in Civil Wars: Wartime Transformations of Social Trust

Abstract

How do civil wars affect social trust? The findings are inconclusive, which may in part be due to differences in the characteristics of wars. My theory suggests that the bounds of the war, in terms of geography and identity, impinge on the bounds of trust that will be undermined. Wars that are unrestricted in nature, i.e. without a clearly defined identity and geographical focus (e.g. nonethnic governmental wars), curtail generalized trust more than restricted civil wars (e.g. ethnic territorial wars). In restricted civil wars, category-based trust will diminish more visibly. I use original qualitative data from the cases of the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey— a restricted war— and the Maoist insurgency in Peru— an unrestricted war— to develop and support my theory and cross-national quantitative data to test parts of the theory.

Şule YAYLACI

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[a] Orcid ID: 0000-0001-7701-5962
Phone: 202-981-8312
Banting Postdoctoral Fellow
Penn Conflict and Identity Lab
University of Pennsylvania
Address:133 S. 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6215
syaylaci@sas.upenn.edu

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Introduction

How do civil wars affect a country's average trust levels? Trust is the basis of cooperation,[1] order,[2] and social capital.[3] Empirical studies show the indispensability of trust for sustaining community interactions, participation in civil society, development, and the democratic state.[4] Civil wars are considered destructive for war-torn countries.[5] Many studies show that exposure to conflict undermines trust levels, at least in ethnic civil wars.[6] Other studies, counter intuitively perhaps, find that higher violence intensity leads to greater levels of generalized trust.[7] Yet, others fail to find any significant effect

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[1] Rafael La Porta et al., "Trust in Large Organizations," *American Economic Review* 87, no. 2 (1997): 333–38; Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Diego Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust?," in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta, Book, Section vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 213–37.

[2] Barbara Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order*, Book, Whole (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996).

[3] James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 95–120; Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–78.

[4] John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997): 999–1023; Jacob Dearmon and Kevin Grier, "Trust and Development," *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 71, no. 2 (2009): 210–20; Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Who Trusts?: The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies," *European Societies* 5, no. 2 (2003): 93–137.

[5] Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC: The World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003); Jennifer A. Widner, "Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Book, Section vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 222–36.

[6] e.g. Alessandra Cassar, Pauline Grosjean, and Sam Whitt, "Legacies of Violence: Trust and Market Development," *Journal of Economic Growth* 18, no. 3 (2013): 285–318; Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, "Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda," *Journal of Economic Growth* 18, no. 3 (2013): 217–52; Robert M. Kunovich and Randy Hodson, "Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia," *Social Forces* 78, no. 2 (1999): 643–68.

[7] Michael J. Gilligan, Benjamin J. Pasquale, and Cyrus Samii, "Civil War and Social Capital: Behavioral-Game Evidence from Nepal," *American Journal of Political Science*

of civil war on generalized trust.[8] How do we explain these mixed findings? There is no coherent theory articulating how trust is transformed in the face of armed conflict, and no empirical study to date explicates the mechanism of trust transformations during civil war.

Some works signal that civil wars may have heterogenous effects on different groups or types of trust. De Luca and Verpoorten, for example, caution that outgroups are most affected from the diminishing of trust due to civil war violence, particularly groups that are associated with the perpetrators of violence.[9] Focusing on distrust for out-groups, Whitt shows that even though trust in co-ethnics is higher than trust in non-co-ethnics in post-conflict Bosnia, there is much variation.[10] Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti show that trust in known people and relatives is not affected by ethno-religious civil war in Uganda so wars may have differential effects on types of social trust.[11] Traunmüller, Born, and Freitag[12] recently found that religious wars reduce trust more so than ethnic wars but an explanation as to why this is so is missing in the literature. A recent review indicates that positive outcomes of war violence on pro-social behaviour may be more parochial, and more indicative of ingroup bias, which could hamper intercommunal dialogue and breed

58, no. 3 (2014): 604–19.

[8] Pauline Grosjean, "Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries," *Comparative Economic Studies* 56, no. 3 (2014): 424–51.

[9] "Civil War, Social Capital and Resilience in Uganda," *Oxford Economic Papers* 67, no. 3 (2015): 661–86.

[10] Sam Whitt, "Institutions and Ethnic Trust: Evidence from Bosnia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 2 (2010): 271–92.

[11] "Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda."

[12] "How Civil War Experience Affects Dimensions of Social Trust in a Cross-National Comparison .Available at SSRN: Https://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=2545816 or Http://Dx.Doi.Org/10.2139/Ssrn.2545816," 2015, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545816.

a new cycle of conflict.[13] Building on these insights, I decided to inquire how characters of civil wars matter and how exactly conflict affects different types of trust.

I argue that civil wars undermine different types of trust depending on whether they are bound by geography and a specific group identity, two important dimensions of civil war. The narrower the scope of war violence in terms of geography and group-focus— the more restricted the violence is, the more likely that identity-based trust will be undermined. The broader the scope of violence regarding these dimensions, the more likely it is that generalized trust will be undermined. I use qualitative data to help build and illustrate my theory and quantitative data to test the major hypotheses.

For the qualitative part of my research, I conducted in-depth studies of the civil wars in Turkey and Peru in 2013-2014, which were instrumental in updating my causal priors and developing the mechanisms of my theory. I conducted a total of 82 expert interviews, 158 interviews and 34 focus group meetings with ordinary people and sought to situate the individuals experiencing wartime events in social context.[14] I then used time series cross-national datasets to test whether the main patterns of trust predicted by the theory are observed across different countries. The quantitative results support the hypothesis regarding a stronger negative effect of unrestricted wars on social trust as compared to the effect of restricted wars.

This paper advances our understanding of postwar societies by shedding light onto

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[13] Michal Bauer et al., "Can War Foster Cooperation?," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 30, no. 3 (2016): 249–74.

[14] see Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, "Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013): 418–32.

how trust relations transform during wartime. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first qualitative inquiry of trust (trans)formations in conflict settings and the most comprehensive quantitative analysis of the relationship between war and trust with the largest dataset available to date. Finally, my framework focuses on individuals who are not directly victimized while most of the empirical literature focuses only on the experiences of the primary war victims who were directly exposed to violence i.e. who suffered from physical or property damages.[15] In most civil war contexts, however, a large portion of civilians are often away from the clash zones and yet war still deeply impacts their lives.[16] By shifting the focus on such individuals, I offer a broader perspective and and address the aforementioned gaps regarding trust transformations during civil war. The findings provide valuable input for post-conflict recovery programs by crystallizing which component of social capital needs more rebuilding.

Trust

Trust is central to social relations as recognized by sociological theorists, political scientists and economists alike.[17] Trust facilitates cooperation, helps people cope with uncertainty, and maintains social order by reducing complexity. [18] Many social theorists

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[15] see Şule Yaylacı and Christopher G. Price, “Exposure to Violence as Explanatory Variable: Meaning, Measurement, and Theoretical Implications of Different Indicators,” *International Studies Review* 25, no. 1 (2023): viac066 for further details on exposure to violence.
[16] Yaylacı and Price.
[17] Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order*.
[18] Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995); Russell Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, Book, Whole (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Niklas Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” ed. Diego Gambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking of Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000), 94–107.

have concluded that without trust it is hard to imagine sustainable social relationships.[19] Understanding the changes in social trust, particularly diagnosing why and how decline occurs, is of paramount importance particularly for post-conflict peace building purposes.

Trust connotes a belief that the others will not deliberately harm you or act against your interests,[20] which implies that there is shared interest between the parties.[21] This paper focuses on two types of social trust: generalized and identity-based. Generalized trust concerns unknown others —strangers— as opposed to particularized trust, which denotes trust in known others —closed ingroups (e.g. family, friends, co-workers).[22] Generalized trust is a shared assumption about the honesty, integrity, and good faith of others — measures of trustworthiness— in social interactions.[23] Identity-based trust, also called

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[19] David Good, "Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust," in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 31–48; Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power*, Book, Whole (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), 4–10; Adam B. Seligman, *The Problem of Trust*, Book, Whole (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 13.

[20] Delhey and Newton, "Who Trusts?: The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies"; Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust?"

[21] Mark E. Warren, "Democratic Theory and Trust," in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 310–46.

[22] Markus Freitag and Richard Traunmüller, "Spheres of Trust: An Empirical Analysis of the Foundations of Particularised and Generalised Trust," *European Journal of Political Research* 48, no. 6 (2009): 782–803; Ken Newton and Sonja Zmerli, "Three Forms of Trust and Their Association," *European Political Science Review* 3, no. 02 (2011): 169–200.

[23] See Bauer and Freitag "Measuring Trust," in *Oxford Handbook of Political and Social Trust*, ed. Eric M. Uslaner, Book, Section vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 15–37. for a contrast of trust and generalized trust and Delhey and Newton "Who Trusts?: The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Societies." for a discussion of conceptualization of trust as an individual property or a social system property.

category or group-based trust, [24] extends from social identity theory.[25] Identity-based trust entails trusting a person with whom one has an identity link even though there is no personal relationship or analogously distrusting someone because of her group membership to a particular identity (ethnicity, religion, etc.). The assumption is that sharing a social categorization magnifies the commonality among members of the category.[26]

Model of Trust

Before laying out the framework for how trust changes, we first need to establish how one decides whether people are trustworthy. When trust concerns unknown strangers, necessary knowledge to assess them will come from pieces that can help figure out the extent of trustworthiness of others. My model focuses on our expectations about the intentions of unknown others regarding our interests. A trust relationship is conditioned on the "congruence of interest between the truster and trustee".[27] When we say that we trust someone, we mean trusting in the intention of others not to deceive us or act in a way that can damage our interest and trusting in their capability to deliver their intentions.[28] In the

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[24] Markus Freitag and Paul C. Bauer, "Testing for Measurement Equivalence in Surveys Dimensions of Social Trust across Cultural Contexts," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77, no. S1 (2013): 24–44; Roderick M. Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions," *Annual Review of Psychology* 50, no. 1 (1999): 569–98.

[25] Henri Tajfel, "Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour," *Social Science Information* 13, no. 2 (1974): 65–93; Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago, IL: Hall Publishers, 1979), 33–47.

[26] Dietlind Stolle, "Trusting Strangers-the Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective," *Österreichische Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft* 31, no. 4 (2002): 397–412.

[27] Mark E. Warren, "The Nature and Logic of Bad Social Capital," in *The Handbook of Social Capital*, ed. Dario Castiglione, Jan W. Van Deth, and Guglielmo Wolleb (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137.

[28] Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust?"

case of generalized trust, it is trusting in people/strangers i.e. believing that on average most people will not act in a way that is going to harm us or harm things that matter to us.

When deciding whether to trust a person or not, we largely generalize from past interactions, [29] however, the foundation of trust is beyond experiential. I assume that trust is not just a function of expectations based on personal experiences and information but also a result of dispositional factors such as personality [30] as well as social norms. We can thus represent trust in abstract strangers as follows:

$$f(trust) = p^* + E|C$$

where

p^* is the baseline trust gauging the propensity to trust, as a personality trait. This is a somewhat fixed notion.

E is expectations, which is an assessment of another person or group's capacity and credibility not to hurt our interests. E is determined in part by past individual (self) experiences and in part by our social interactions with others.

C is Context. Expectations are calculated in a given context. Contexts vary with regards to:

- Social norms
- Demographic features
- Structural characteristics (security and crime, contextual diversity etc).

Propensity to trust (p^*) is a trait that subsumes the influence of factors other than

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[29] Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*.
[30] Herbert W. Kee and Robert E. Knox, "Conceptual and Methodological Considerations in the Study of Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14, no. 3 (1970): 357–66; Julian B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Interpersonal Trust.," *American Psychologist* 26, no. 5 (1971): 443.

personality such as socialization in my formulation. It reflects an individual's general faith in humanity as a learned behavior. Expectations about others (E) are a crucial part of this model**.** As we acquire new experiences and gain insights about others' perceptions and learn from their (un)trusting behavior, these further inform our assessment and expectations about the extent to which others will act within our interests.[31] Of note, interest encompasses both material and immaterial benefits. Not acting within one's self-interest can mean imposing costs on one's emotional and mental well-being by undermining peace and security of their loved ones, friends, or hurting things that are of value. Changes in context (C) such as demographic shifts due to internal migration or forced displacement may also prompt individuals to reassess their trust evaluations. My formulation, as such, is dynamic and allows an individual to have very low trust early in life and to slowly build stronger trust over time and vice versa.

Identity-based trust differs from than generalized trust precisely because there is some preconceived notion about the object of trust based on group membership heuristics, which is a type of mental heuristics individuals use to make judgments about strangers, regarding their motives, integrity, and capacity.[32] *Expectations* in identity-based trust, will then be adjusted to refer to the trustworthiness of others that belong in a certain identity group, for which individuals may draw on personal experience with other group members or extended experiences of ingroup members with outgroup members. For people sharing the same group identity, "in-group criteria […] such as behavioral

[31] Stolle, "Trusting Strangers-the Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective."
[32] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Probability, Representativeness, and the Conjunction Fallacy," *Psychological Review* 90, no. 4 (1983): 293–315.

similarity, geographical proximity, frequency of interaction, or common fate […] can serve as a rule […] that bypasses the need for personal knowledge and the costs of negotiating”.[33] For outgroup members, ingroup members’ previous interactions with a member of ethnic group A will be one of the main guiding elements in determining whether A people are trustworthy. In tandem with personal experience, experiences of others, hearsay, and social norms will help determine this judgment.

Theory of Wartime Transformation of Trust

Trust has to be achieved within a familiar world, and changes may occur in the familiar features of the world which will have an impact on the possibility of developing trust in human relations”.[34] War may disrupt exactly these familiar features of the world. Civil war induces high uncertainty;[35] information asymmetries with respect to intentions of others abound particularly with rising insecurities and threat perceptions.[36] Motivations and preferences of groups tend to shift,[37] while familiarity fades. As the war unfolds, new frames of references and identities emerge alongside manifestations of conflict.

Wartime violence is often the main trigger that changes the dynamics of trust, as violence violates the main principle of trust: *belief in the intention of others not to protect your interest (and hence* (E) *in the trust model)*. If the two parties have incompatible

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[33] Stolle, “Trusting Strangers-the Concept of Generalized Trust in Perspective,” 401–2.
[34] Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” 95.
[35] Anastasia Shesterinina, *Mobilizing in Uncertainty by Anastasia Shesterinina* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021).
[36] Christopher G. Price and Şule Yaylacı, “What Exactly Are the Social and Political Consequences of Civil War? A Critical Review and Analysis of Recent Scholarship,” *Civil Wars* 23, no. 2 (2021): 283–310.
[37] Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

interests— consider the rebel group and its support base versus the supporters of the state— it is unlikely for one group to believe that the other will refrain from harming the truster's interest. Wartime violence also re-writes the heuristics individuals use when making judgments about others' trustworthiness by realigning the group identities of the truster and trustee along the new identities evoked or made salient by the war such as ethnic, religious, sectarian, national, regional, or political ones.[38]

I suggest that two dimensions of violence are particularly pertinent to trust calculations and expectations: geography and group-focus, derivatives of the motive and cleavages of the conflict which largely shape the character of civil wars.[39] The broader the scope of violence concerning these two dimensions—geography and group focus — the more likely it is that generalized trust will be undermined. The narrower the scope of violence, the more restricted it is, the type of trust it affects will also be constrained and thus the more likely identity-based trust will be undermined.

Geography of violence signifies where violence is observed within a country's borders. The larger the geography that violence against civilians is able reach, the larger the size of the population affected will be. The geography of violence can range from affecting only a small delimited area (highly restricted) to inflicting every region in a country (highly unrestricted). Group focus is about the cleavages of the war; a war being

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[38] Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 539–61.

[39] Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (2010): 3–57; Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (2003): 475–94.

restricted by identity means that parties to the conflict are distinguished by clear identity markers i.e. distinctive group characteristics (i.e., language, dress, physical traits, accent, name, etc.) are easily observable.[40] In such cases war violence is associated with an identifiable ethnic/religious group, and divisions along the same identity lines are expected after violence erupts.

Generalized trust is about expectations of others (E). "War has an immediate effect upon the attitude of everyone who is brought into connection with it," as Abraham Lowell once said.[41] When threat of violence is geographically close or when the context (C) they live in undergoes significant transformation due to violence in the vicinity, individuals' belief in the intention of others would shift and *people at large* may lose their trust in unknown others. The higher the number of such people who lose their trust in unknown others, the higher the chances for country-level generalized trust to decline.

Identity-based trust is most susceptible to group polarization as a result of violence and responsibility attributed to a certain group for violence. To the extent that an identifiable outgroup is assigned blame for violence, distrust in outgroup members should ensue once violence begins. Because the group associated with perpetrating violence is *identifiable* with group characteristics, if the perpetrator of violence is from an ethnic group A, all members of group A will be stigmatized as possibly harming a trustee's interests. Yet, if the perpetrator is not identifiable by any clear marker (such as religion,

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[40] Kanchan Chandra, *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2013).
[41] Lowell *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923), 222.

ethnicity, or race[42]) and assuming that the perpetrator is not wearing a uniform, anyone can theoretically be a perpetrator. This creates a shift in the expectations about unknown others (E), and hence generalized trust, instead of trust in members of particular identifiable groups associated with the parties involved in conflict.

In the empirical studies of civil war, geography and group-focus roughly correspond to motive and cleavage. Regarding motive, research on civil war distinguishes between wars fought for state control (governmental) versus those fought for self-determination (territorial).[43] When governmental change is sought after, violence is likely to be spread across the country and more likely to reach to the capital so violence is geographically less restricted.[44] In secessionist wars geography of violence is vastly limited to the territory in dispute; indeed "many conflicts fought for secession or autonomy have relatively little effect on day-to-day life in the rest of the country".[45]

Regarding cleavage, civil wars can be identity-based or not.[46] Territorial wars is more often fought along identity lines (known as ethnic territorial); put differently ethnic

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[42] see Nils-Christian Bormann, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Manuel Vogt, "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 4 (2017): 744–71.
[43] Henrikas Bartusevičius, "Introducing the Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 1 (2016): 89–110; Halvard Buhaug, "Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006): 691–708; Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–37.
[44] Halvard Buhaug and Scott Gates, "The Geography of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 4 (2002): 417–33.
[45] Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, "Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012): 803.
[46] see Nils B. Weidmann, "Micro-Cleavages and Violence in Civil Wars: A Computational Assessment," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 5 (2016): 539–58; Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) for micro-cleavages.

wars often break out over territorial demands.[47] In *ethnic wars,* insurgents brand themselves with an ethnic identity, where the putative ethnic difference is fundamental to the conflict.[48] Nevertheless, both governmental and territorial wars may be restricted by identity to a certain degree as discussed below.[49] Between 1946-2009, there were 105 ethnic territorial wars such as the Sri Lankan Civil War with LTTE-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 1984-2009, but only 44 ethnic governmental wars. Difference is even starker within nonethnic wars: while there were 118 nonethnic governmental wars such as the El Salvadorian Civil War with FMLN— Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, 1979-1991, there were only 18 nonethnic territorial wars.[50]

Inasmuch as being territorial vs. governmental or ethnic vs. nonethnic taps the restriction vis-à-vis geography and identity to an extent, the binary categories for each dimension are highly limited to showcase the arguments of the theory. First, seemingly nonethnic wars can have ethnic dimensions; for example, the Guatemalan civil war (1960-1996) is classified as a nonethnic governmental war but the Maya population was targeted as the enemy by the government as the rebels began to recruit predominantly in the Maya highland villages in the 1980s. Analogously, ethnic wars can have governmental goals such as the wars in Burundi and Rwanda. Secondly, while governmental wars spread across various subnational geographies much more than territorial wars, how much they

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[47] Nicholas Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 3 (2001): 259–82.
[48] Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1998, 423–52.
[49] Bartusevičius, "Introducing the Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) Dataset."
[50] Julian Wucherpfennig et al., "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War," *World Politics* 64, no. 1 (2012): 79–115.

spread vary. In the same vein, while ethnic wars have more identity-based restrictions, the extent to which the relevant identity groups are distinguishable vary. Hence the theory considers wars on a continuum vis-à-vis restrictions by geography and identity, rather than just being restricted or unrestricted for either dimension. Thus, when we plot wars along the axes of restrictions by geography and identity, civil wars can fall on a much broader space than just the four corners.

Figure 1 shows examples of civil wars along the axes of restriction by geography and identity. In this paper, I use a case of an ethnic territorial war as a most restricted type and a nonethnic governmental war as a most unrestricted type to showcase how they differ with respect to their effects on trust. I argue that wars that are highly restricted by identity and geography undermine identity-based trust more. In wars unrestricted by identity and geography, we should however observe a steeper decline in generalized trust than the one in restricted wars. Below I further explain the logic behind this proposition.



Figure I. Civil wars restrictions by geography and identity

Linking War and Trust: The Mechanism of Threat

Perceived threat is a main mechanism between war violence and trust. It is the principal individual-level stimuli behind changes in wartime trust calculations.[51] Personal physical threat is an important component of perceived threat,[52] and it is the threat individuals perceive to their own and their family's security, bodily rights, and property. One psychological process underlying personal physical threat is mortality salience, which includes heightened concerns about death. The second component of perceived threat is sociotropic threat, which refers to aggregate-level (e.g., national) concerns of security stemming from war violence.[53] Sociotropic threat is in large part a function of state discourses and the media. This type of threat serves to shape the public's perceptions in order to fortify the state's authority and legitimacy and carve the base for group polarization.[54]

Restrictions of war by geography and group identity shape the extent of threat perception. If the war is restricted to a certain area, as often observed in secessionist wars, violence will also be *restricted to the territory* in dispute, and the personal security threat it poses will not reverberate much outside the respective territory. Hence, the residents

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[51] John Ishiyama et al., "What Are the Effects of Large-Scale Violence on Social and Institutional Trust? Using the Civil War Literature to Understand the Case of Mexico, 2006–2012," *Civil Wars* 20, no. 1 (2018): 1–23.
[52] "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans' Support for the War on Terror," *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3 (2011): 546–60.
[53] Leonie Huddy et al., "The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat," *Political Psychology* 23, no. 3 (2002): 485–509; Daniel Stevens and Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Citizens and Security Threats: Issues, Perceptions and Consequences Beyond the National Frame," *British Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 1 (2016): 149–75.
[54] John Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

at large shall not fear for their lives as long as they live outside of the territory at stake because violence would be more localized. When wars are not restricted to a geography, often observed when governmental change is sought after, violence is likely to spread across the country and more likely to reach to the capital.[55] As the geographic reach of violence expands, so does the size of population that fears. The tactical choices of violence may also have some systematic differences. Fortna finds that there are more conflicts that are revolutionary i.e. seeking to transform society in fundamental ways such as Maoist conflicts that use terrorism, deliberately indiscriminate violence featuring intentional targeting of innocent civilians, than the secessionist conflicts seeking independence.[56] Indiscriminate nature of targeting should aggravate the fears on a larger scale. However, even when violence is selective or collective,[57] geographic spread of violence against civilians should engender perception of threat and disturb feeling of security.

Changing contexts (C) with rising insecurity and pervasive threat will alter generalized perceptions of people's intentions about harming one another (E). When violence against civilians occur in a geographically proximate region, even if there is no personal exposure, the community-level fear generated by the information of proximity of violence will reverberate across all residents' personal lives. For example, hearing about people being killed in car bombs on their way to work, or attacks in bus stations,

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[55] Buhaug and Gates, "The Geography of Civil War."
[56] Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* 69, no. 03 (2015): 536.
[57] Christopher G. Price and Şule Yaylacı, "A New Typology of Targeting in Civil War," *Unpublished Manuscript*, 2022.

stadiums, or assassinations all should contribute to this widespread fear and diminishing trust in others. The higher the number of people who experience declining trust in others the lower the country-level generalized trust will get.

Not knowing where the threat may come from would further aggravate the fear, insecurity and further lower the trust. In wars that do not involve identity-based restriction, the enemy is more anonymous, which should magnify the sense of fear. The belief that 'anyone can harm anyone' leads to updating expectations about all others' intentions. Non-identity based wars are often revolutionary wars targeting the capital and overthrow of the governments, thus the geography of the war is broader (more unrestricted) as well,[58] widening the geographic scope of threat perceptions. Given high uncertainty and the prevalence of threat, individuals will withdraw their trust in others as anyone may harm their interests, and generalized trust levels will plummet.

Identity-based trust will be most at stake in wars waged over a grievance relevant to a particular identity group (group-focused). Because the group associated with perpetrating violence is *identifiable* with group characteristics, threat perceptions should be largely extended to the group members. For example, if the perpetrator of violence is from an ethnic group A, all members of group A will be stigmatized as possibly harming a trustee's interests. Yet, if the perpetrator is not identifiable by any clear marker (ethnicity, religion, etc.) and assuming that the perpetrator is not wearing a uniform, anyone can theoretically be a perpetrator. This creates a shift in the expectations about unknown others instead of members of particular identifiable groups associated with the parties

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[58] Buhaug and Gates, "The Geography of Civil War."

involved in conflict.

Beyond personal threat considerations, a sociotropic threat can be mobilized via discursive frameworks.[59] Under rebel threat the state may produce a discourse of existential threat and capitalize on agitation to galvanize people to support itself. In secessionist conflicts, the emphasis will be on the disputed territory and threat against the national unity while in governmental conflicts it will be more about threat to way of life. Those who do not support the cause of the rebels or who do not seek a change in either borders or way of life will consider this harming their interest. Through this discourse, the insurgents who are perceived to be posing sociotropic (and personal) threat become enemies. The group members associated with the insurgents will then be perceived as harming the interest and the state, its institutions, and actors are glorified in their eyes. When personal security is not at stake, discourses around sociotropic threat could guide the effect of war violence on people's evaluation of others. In geographically restricted wars, I expect personal security risk not to be prevalent across the nation, thus sociotropic threat is more likely to prevail. Perception of collective harm to the nation's interests (in the case of territorial wars, interest would be maintaining the integrity of the borders) should be instrumental in trust calculations as *interest of self and interest of the nation* may be blended. Expecting that the group members will hurt your interests will then lead to decreased identity-based trust.

This leads us to the following six testable hypotheses, the first four on individual-level and the last two on country-level:

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[59] Stuart J. Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions* (Cornell University Press, 2015).

H1: Perception of personal security threat is more likely to be higher/more widespread in unrestricted wars than it is in restricted wars.

H2: Perception of sociotropic threat in restricted wars is more likely to be higher than unrestricted wars.

H3: Individuals in a country involved in an unrestricted war are more likely to develop distrust towards all others irrespective of their identity (decrease in generalized trust) than individuals in a country involved in a restricted war.

H4: Individuals in a country involved in a restricted war are more likely to develop distrust towards non co-ethnics (decrease in identity-based trust) than individuals in a country involved in an unrestricted war.

H5: Countries experiencing an unrestricted civil war vis-à-vis geography and identity should see decline in their generalized trust levels as compared to countries with no such war.

H6: Countries experiencing an unrestricted civil war should see a larger and more significant decline in their generalized trust levels as compared to countries with restricted wars.

Empirical Strategy

I use mixed-methods in building, updating, and testing my theory, combining rich qualitative data from case studies and pooled cross-national time-series quantitative data. Guided by the premises of my theory, that restricted and unrestricted wars may have different consequences on trust, I select the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey (fought between *Partiya Karkêren Kurdistanê* [Kurdistan Workers' Party—the PKK] and the Turkish state since 1984) representing a highly restricted war, and the Maoist insurgency in Peru (fought

between the Shining Path [*Sendero Luminoso del Partido Communista del Perú* — Sendero hereafter] and the Peruvian state [1980-2000]) representing a rather unrestricted war.[60] I should note that here I am adopting a nominal, not a rational perspective, to case studies.[61] I am thus "casing" these two studies:

> Casing occurs only when we use an abstract concept to define a fundamental category and standpoint of analysis. It happens when we frame what we are studying in relation to a general type and forge a dialogue in which instances of this type become the basis for insights into one another.[62]

I spent six months in each country (in 2013–2014) doing semi-ethnographic fieldwork. My qualitative data consists of interviews, focus groups, and historical case analysis.[63] I selected different geographies of war across the country, starting from the regions close to the main theatres of operation and extending to the remote corners of each country to ensure variation in experiences with violence and hence threat perceptions: Ankara, İstanbul, Mersin, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, and Gaziantep in Turkey, and Lima, Ayacucho, Arequipa, Cajamarca, Cusco, Tarapoto, and Iquitos in Peru (see Figures

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[60] Both countries suffered from organized intrastate political violence starting around the same time for over two decades and yet democracy survived in both countries. Both Turkey and Peru experienced elite-driven democratic revolutions and multiple military interventions. Turkey and Peru are both multi-ethnic, low trust societies, especially in terms of social trust (they are two of the lowest ranking countries according to World Values Survey data-see Figure A 1 in Appendix Section C). See Appendix section A for further comparative background of the two cases.

[61] Joe Soss, "On Casing a Study versus Studying a Case," *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 16, no. 1 (2018).

[62] Soss, 24.

[63] see Şule Yaylacı, "Utility of Focus Groups in Retrospective Analysis of Conflict Contexts," *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 19 (2020): 1–8 for the benefits of utilizing focus groups along with interviews.

A 2 and A 3 in Appendix Section C). I spent close to a month in each city, except for Lima, where I spent two and a half months, given its centrality to Peruvian politics and society.

In total, I completed 36 expert interviews, 66 in-depth interviews, and 19 focus groups with ordinary people in Peru. In Turkey, I conducted 46 expert interviews, 92 in-depth interviews and 15 focus groups with ordinary people (see Tables A 2-A 6 in Section C for details). Conversations focused on the first 15 years of the conflict (see Appendix Section B1 for details). The details of the coding process are explained in Appendix Section B.2, and examples are available in Table A 7 and 8 in Appendix Section C. For systematic coding, I used NVivo software.[64]

The chosen cases are categorized as ethnic territorial and nonethnic governmental wars in the extant categorization of civil wars, but they are not necessarily the most emblematic of these wars. They were selected because they are extreme representations of territorially and identity-wise concentrated and dispersed wars to elucidate the foundations of the theory. These cases help me construct the mechanisms of my theory and provide me with an opportunity to observe whether main tenets of my theory hold in the empirical world. For example, I find that the narratives in Turkey were predominantly about the sociotropic threat and soldier deaths and, in Peru, about personal threat as I discuss at length below (see Table A 7 and 8 in the Appendix Section C). The narratives also underpin the first four hypotheses stated above.

A Case of Restricted War and Trust: Kurdish Conflict in Turkey (1984-present)

The PKK launched its insurgency on August 15, 1984 with attacks in Şemdinli and

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[64] QSR International Pty Ltd., “NVivo (Version 12.1).,” 2021, https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home.

Eruh, about a year after the transition from military to civilian rule.[65] The rebels initially sought territorial secession to establish an independent state for Kurds. The war was fought between the PKK's organized rebel army and the Turkish state's army, and it is not a popular guerilla war. The fight had been effectively concentrated in the mountainous border zones in the Southeastern Turkey because the dispute was over the Kurdish territories. The guerrillas raided hamlets, villages, and cities in Eastern Turkey, particularly between 1990 and 1995, posing a personal threat to the Kurdish population in the disputed territory. Counterinsurgency operations resulted in the forced displacement of thousands of villagers and various other harms to civilians.[66] Nevertheless, except for the residents in these Eastern hamlets or provinces surrounding the main theatres of operations, most people in Turkey did not face direct threat from the guerrillas or state forces nor did they personally witness any attacks. Indeed, residents of the Western provinces were not exposed to any direct violence, because the PKK did not advance its guerilla war to urban zones.[67] The threat that was featured in my conversations was the threat to the territorial integrity of the nation, and Turkish state's discourse played a critical role in the formation of this sociotropic threat.

Sociotropic threat, and Declining Outgroup Trust

Depiction of the PKK as the enemy killing civilians soldiers and attacking the national integrity of Turkey with secessionist goals was at the core of the official Turkish

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[65] See Appendix Section A3 for a historical background of the conflict.
[66] Ceren Belge, "Civilian victimization and the politics of information in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey," *World Politics* 68, no. 2 (2016): 275–306.
[67] There were brief episodes in 2014. Terrorism is addressed in detail in the Discussion section below.

state's discourse around the war.[68] The casualties of the war, mostly state soldiers, were labelled as 'martyrs' by the state, integral to the representations of the war.[69] In Turkey, this discourse featured many references to the sanctity and non-negotiability of the national borders given the secessionist character of the war in Turkey. A focus group participant recounts:

> I remember when I was in Hatay between 1993–1996. When a funeral for a martyr was brought to the city, all hell would break loose so to speak. The locals would all together condemn the PKK terror and chant: "Martys do not die; motherland does not divide." (Male, Mixed Gender Adult Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 9, 2014).

Because military conscription was compulsory for every man above the age of 18, the death of soldiers was integral to the interpretations of the war via not only the collective threat perceptions, as soldiers were the protectors of the nation, but also personal threat perceptions given that every family had members who were serving or were yet to serve in the army (see Appendix Section A.2 for details on military culture).

Even though official state discourse avoided using the word "Kurd," which is part of long history of denial,[70] that the PKK is a Kurdish organization was a matter of fact. The undisputable Kurdish identity of the PKK brought about association of Kurds with terrorism, which is an oft-observed phenomenon. For example, the rise of prejudice and

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[68] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996): 136–75.
[69] Şule Yaylacı and Onur Bakıner, "Casualties and Support for Violent Conflict in Civil Wars," *Civil Wars* 20, no. 4 (2019): 555–86.
[70] Mesut Yegen, "'Prospective-Turks' or 'Pseudo-Citizens:' Kurds in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 63, no. 4 (2009): 597–615.

discrimination against Muslim Americans after 9/11 in the U.S. is a product of similar cognitive association.[71] The process of recategorization of Kurds as "enemies" involved shifts in the boundaries of ethnic identity occurring in interaction with state's discursive framework. Narratives from two participants exemplify the rising hostility towards Kurds:

> My dad's friend's son was martyred in 1992 in Bitlis. I grew up with this story: Kurds vs. us Turks, and how they [Kurds] are trying to destroy our national unity. All we feel is pain and anger, and these emotions interfere with your thinking ability. All I have felt for Kurds is animosity (Youth Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 11 2014).

Equating Kurds with terrorism and venerating the borders of the country as part of one's identity ultimately shifted expectations of individuals to the motivations of Kurds. The ubiquitous sense of sociotropic threat and martyrs who were the sons, husbands, brothers of people from all walks of life in the 1990s started to define intergroup relations. Two female participants said:

> Every funeral of a martyr rekindles my anger; every time I watch families crying over the coffin of their sons, my heart breaks, my frustration grows. Kurds do not love this country despite everything they have. They would burn it to the ground if they could. I do not believe anything they say (Women Focus Group, Ankara, April 9, 2014).

> Honestly, seeing their pain [of martyr families] and what Kurds have done to us, I

[71] (Federal Bureau of Investigations) FBI, "Hate Crimes Statistics (1996- 2010). Retrieved From:," 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr.

> don't know what to think of them either. […] They [Kurds] may appear to be a [Turkish] nationalist and pro-national unity, but at heart, most of them, I think, are after secession. *How am I supposed to trust?* (#59, Female, Gaziantep, May 12, 2014, emphasis added).

The reason Kurds were not considered trustworthy in the eyes of Turks *was not because of a conflict in personal interests*, *but due to Turks' assumed intentions of Kurds* regarding the future of Kurdish territory—a national matter, emanating from their sociotropic threat perceptions. Individuals inferred their expectations from the others' assumed visions of Turkey's future when deciding whether to think of a particular group as trustworthy or not. Believing Kurds' interests to be at odds with Turks' interests sufficed to break the trust bonds at large, even though, on a personal level, intergroup negative encounters did not necessarily occur. Experience of betrayal is one of the strongest factors that leads to lower levels of trust.[72] The Turks believed that the Kurds engaged in a *collective* betrayal against the national interests, and, hence, their motivations were questioned. One participant's comments capture this shift well:

> Kurds did not do any harm to me personally, but what you are doing to my country you are doing to me. It is so sad that they think their fight is warranted. […] Kurds can do anything they want in this country; yet they choose to hurt us. We do not have the same interests at heart (Men Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 11, 2014).

Many Turks I interviewed mentioned that they stopped shopping at certain grocery

[72] Dietlind Stolle, "Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining and Association," in *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen Cook, Book, Section vols. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 202–44.

stores because the owner is Kurdish. A common remark was: "We don't want our money to support PKK's troops." These comments were a product of state's overarching discourse about the war, the insurgents' motivations, and the group's source of financial support, rather than from personal or direct violent experiences as threatened by the PKK.

Similar to negative attitudes, the evidence for discriminatory practices abounds, especially from ethnic Turks towards Kurds. Many examples relate to neighbourhood relationships and business transactions. One participant tells:

> In Mersin, let's say you are looking to buy land and they are asking 50,000 [Turkish] liras for it. I have witnessed many conversations where they offered the land to a low bidder because he was Turkish. They say "just let it go—this land should not go to a Kurd." They sold it for 45,000 [Turkish liras] to make sure the owner is Turkish (Male, Ankara Youth Focus Group, April 15, 2014).

Besides identity-based outgroup trust, generalized trust also was undermined in the cities hosting much of the displaced people. In coastal cities (Mersin, Istanbul, Izmir, Antalya, etc.) where a significant amount of displaced Kurdish population settled, the assumptions about generalized others shifted. Many of the interviewees who lived in these cities in the 1990s expressed concerns about robberies, assaults, or demographic changes. While the decline in interpersonal trust has not been as widespread, since it was limited to the cities that received a large influx of displaced population, the decline in identity-based trust has been pervasive. The geographic and ethnic boundaries of the war in Turkey restricted the type of trust that is most affected to identity-based trust and carved the path for diminished outgroup trust.

Case of an Unrestricted War: Maoist Rebellion in Peru

In Peru, Sendero waged a nonethnic governmental war against the state, launching its strategic offensive on the day of the first democratic election (May 17, 1980) after years of military rule (the first election since 1963).[73] While the rebel discourse featured historical repression and subjugation of indigenous peoples, the leaders read the history solely through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology and placed emphasis on class rather than ethnicity. Sendero deployed Popular Guerilla Armies, and thus threat and distrust was more pervasive than it had been in Turkey (see Appendix Section A.1 for further comparison to PKK).

In the early years of the conflict (1980–1986), violence was more concentrated in the *sierra*. Eventually, violence and social exclusion intermingled in Peru, and the regions most affected by violence were the poorest regions.[74] Ayacucho alone had about two thirds of the total victims, and 78% of the victims were indigenous people from the *sierra* (TRC, 2004). Personal threat was ubiquitous in the afflicted regions of the highlands, which by 1988 included Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac, Cusco, and Tarapoto (though it was the MRTA[75] not Sendero). Even though those in the highlands faced graver risks to their lives, those in the urban areas were by no means shielded from personal threat.

Sendero's People's War expanded its reach quite rapidly to the urban zones; by the

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[73] See Appendix Section A3 for a historical background of the conflict.
[74] TRC, "Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report" (Lima, Peru, 2004), http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/.
[75] The MRTA refers to Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and it was another insurgency active simultaneously with the Sendero, but on much smaller scale.

end of 1980, *it was active in 22 of 24 regions of Peru*.[76] By 1990, virtually half of country was under emergency rule.[77] Sendero's advance into urban zones posed tangible individual security risks to residents. A wide repertoire of violence including car bombs at street corners, assassinations, blackouts, and random attacks, made the threat visible.[78] Personal threat was no longer exclusive to the indigenous peasants in the *sierra*; it became a pervasive phenomenon across most of Peru especially in the five years between 1987 and 1992. Civilians thus far not exposed to violence faced an increased risk of becoming a victim. Violence reached Lima towards the end of 1980s, and according to my research, *Limañeans* (long-term residents/locals of Lima) felt under intense threat particularly between 1989-1992. Sendero sought to destroy the state's legitimacy and attacked all tools and institutions of the old regime in order to establish a new one. Hence, the collective threat Sendero posed was to the state and the regime, rather than to the territory. Even though Sendero had significant popular support and was advancing quickly, the Peruvian state did not frame the violence as an existential sociotropic threat. The collective threat Sendero was posing became clearer once Lima was under siege. Indeed, a common understanding was that until the violence reached Lima (with particular reference to the Tarata bombing[79] on July 16, 1992), the government did not take the guerrillas seriously.

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[76] see Robert B. Kent, "Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru," *Geographical Review* 83, no. 4 (1993): 441–54 for geographical dimensions of the insurgency.
[77] Carlos I. Degregori, "The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path," ed. David E. Apter, The Legitimization of Violence (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 33–82.
[78] David S. Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
[79] It was the biggest and most impactful attack of Shining Path in Lima. Car bombings occurred on Tarata street, home of the financial centers in Lima. 25 people died and 155 were injured (TRC, 2004, p. 661).

Unlike Turkey, where civilian and military victims had a greater degree of visibility, the Peruvian state did not generate a discourse around war casualties—one exception is the Uchuraccay massacre, where eight journalists from Lima were mistakenly killed by the peasants.

My interviews with the residents of Lima, Cajamarca, and Iquitos, areas that were not affected during the early years of violence, if at all (Sendero never reached Iquitos), show that even though some civilians unexposed to violence were aware of the extensive violence in other parts of their country, they were not personally preoccupied by it until it arrived in Lima around 1988. It was mostly through personal experiences that war shaped social relations and induced updates in assumptions of others' intentions. However, as noted in the example in Turkey, the war concerned everyone as it was effectively integrated into the discourse as a matter of life and death for the nation.

Fear, "Not Knowing Who is Who", and the Decline of Generalized Trust

As an unsurprising result of geographically far-reaching terror of Sendero, extensive fear and personal threat were the dominant themes in my interviews. A migrant from Ayacucho to Lima comments:

> Insecurities were terrible when I was in Ayacucho. I always wanted to escape, to Lima or wherever, because the fear was terrible. It was not just those that would come and steal, but also the military that come to do their patrol [*hacer sus rondas*] that posed threat. […] No one was on our side, *how could one trust anyone*? (#2, Lima, September 19, 2013, emphasis added).

Pervasive distrust, observed across various geographies, was so entrenched that it even extended to family members. Many people were not sure if their spouses, children, or

siblings joined the ranks of Sendero, let alone their neighbours, colleagues, or friends.[80] One common comment that was uttered by 85% of the people I interviewed was:

> One did not know who is a terrorist. Your next-door neighbour could have been a terrorist, and you would not have known that (Women Focus Group, Ayacucho, January 20, 2014).

Distrust was not exclusive to the hot clash zones (Figure A 2). Any area where Sendero was present was also afflicted with distrust. In all of my conversations, the issue of "now knowing who is who," came up especially in Lima. As one person stated: "At the time, I was in Lima, and we were just afraid about having a conversation. We did not know who we are talking to" (#26, Male, Arequipa, October 30, 2013).

The impossibility of identifying someone's ideological orientation and the strong possibility of informers in every circle rendered social interactions precarious, and this was not unwarranted. In Lima especially, universities, state departments, unions, and many public institutions had been infiltrated by *Senderista*s. Every professional I spoke to in Lima (about half of the local participants) mentioned something along these lines:

> Because Sendero seeped into the work places, I had fellow *Senderista*s. Elena Iparraguirre, the wife of Abimael Guzmán, was a teacher, and she was my desk partner. We didn't know she was on the command team of Sendero. It really was difficult to assume that you know someone well (#16, Female, Lima, September 26, 2013).

As a result, even the most mundane interactions became challenging in the

[80] Kimberly Theidon, *Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru* (Philadelphia: University of Pennslyvania Press, 2013).

besieged areas. Research participants recounted even avoiding eye contact even when buying groceries, paying bills, or waiting for a bus.

The evidence for declining generalized trust was overwhelming in my research, as indicated in the excerpts above. Not only trust in unknown others, but also trust in known others (particularized trust) decreased. The reported uncertainty about one's orientation, identity, and trustworthiness related to the type of the armed struggle. Not having easily identifiable markers of *Senderistas* contributed to quick evaporation of trust in others, as it was practically impossible to "know who is who."

Restricted vs. Unrestricted Wars: Threat and Trust Comparisons

These two cases empirically demonstrate the stark distinctions between wars that are restricted and unrestricted by geographical violence and group relevance, and as corollary to that, threat perceptions. To recap, in restricted wars, violence is delimited to a certain territory, and civilian killings are ordinarily fewer,[81] meaning that there are weaker grounds for pervasive fear for personal security. While individuals may not perceive a personal security threat, given the identity-based cleavages in restricted wars, they may perceive a collective attack on their identities,[82] and a sociotropic threat to the nation based on the territorial threat. If the war is not restricted by territory and identity, violence is more likely to be widespread across different geographies and across groups (as observed in ideological wars using popular guerilla armies),[83] leading to pervasive

[81] Jason M. Quinn, "Territorial Contestation and Repressive Violence in Civil War," *Defence and Peace Economics* 26, no. 5 (2015): 536–54.
[82] see Anastasia Shesterinina, "Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 3 (2016): 411–27 for collective threat framing.
[83] Buhaug and Gates, "The Geography of Civil War"; Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman,

personal security threats and fears.

We can see these distinctions clearly in Figure 2, which shows the prevalence of threat- and group-related codes in the qualitative data from Turkey and Peru. Besides the contrast of sociotropic versus personal threat perceptions, the presence of heavier outgroup delineation and negative feelings toward a particular "other" supports the theory. Because the effects of restricted and unrestricted wars vary significantly in terms of inducing personal threat and outgroup distinction, decline in trust concerned different types of trust. In Turkey, while it was the outgroup trust that was most undermined; in Peru generalized interpersonal trust suffered more.

In my theory, I have laid out that trust is a function of expectations regarding the protection of interests. In Turkey, self-interest is merged with interest of the nation, and the state discourse played an important role in generating this merger. In the case of ethnic territorial wars, the goals of the insurgency (self-determination in the form of secession or territorial autonomy) conflicts with the one-nation, one-flag notion of the state, whose goal is to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation. Withdrawal of trust is based on identity of the trustee, not based on any actual wrongdoing. This accounts for the significant decline in outgroup trust, whereas there was not a parallel reference to trust in generalized others. In Peru, the war, in large part, affected trust judgments through direct experiences of pervasive insecurity stemming from the unbounded character of the war, posing a threat to self-interest. Although sociotropic threat was also palpable in Peru, direct threats of violence to individuals was more overwhelming, and affected people's

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"One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War Insights from New Fatality Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 233–46.

trust in others. This is not to say that trust towards Indigenous peoples did not decline, but that Senderistas could be from any ethnic background, and that there was no identifiable marker distinguishing the parties involved in the conflict along with the geographically broad reach of violence against civilians rendered trust in everyone to be negatively affected. Distrust towards the outgroups in Peru was most conspicuous in areas that attracted an influx of displaced populations such as in Lima or Arequipa. My conversations in Iquitos and Cajamarca did not indicate any strong judgment against the people from the *sierra* after the conflict, unlike the ones in Lima.



Figure 2. Prevalence of threat and discrimination-related codes in the interviews

Note: Percentages indicate the average coverage in each code. For example, when a sentence is coded as personal threat, Nvivo shows how much of the total transcript the sentence accounts for (coverage). In most cases, in one interview transcript, there are multiple sentences/paragraphs marked under the same code. I summed the coverage for each marked code per transcript. Average of the 1.80% means that 1.80% of the total conversation is marked as personal threat. I then calculated the grand average coverage by dividing the grand total to number of transcripts, which is what the cells indicate.

Quantitative Hypothesis-Testing: Gauging the Generalizability of the Theory

The qualitative evidence from Turkey and Peru lend support to the first four hypotheses where the unit of analysis is individuals. Hypotheses 5 and 6 concern country-level effects of war on trust. Countries experiencing an unrestricted civil war should see decline in their generalized trust levels as compared to countries with no such war, and the decline in generalized trust should be larger than countries with restricted wars. To test these hypotheses, I use data that measures of trust at the country level (dependent variable) and data on civil war incidence (independent variable) over time from Girardin et al.'s initiative "Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform (GROW^{up})".[84]

Data

Dependent Variable: Social Trust

Finding annual global measures of social trust is challenging, and for hypotheses testing I rely on two distinct indicators. The first is a latent construct by Justwan, Bakker, and Berejikian for all countries in the international system from 1946 to 2009.[85] The second one is the classic trust question asked in every World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS): "Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful".[86] Both of these measure have drawbacks as discussed below but together they help to show at the very least proof of concept.

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[84] ETH Zurich. http://growup.ethz.ch/, 2015.
[85] "Measuring Social Trust and Trusting the Measure," *The Social Science Journal* 55, no. 2 (2018): 149–59.
[86] Ronald Inglehart et al., "World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version" (Madrid: JD Systems Institute, 2014), https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp.

The WVS was launched in 1980. The surveys are conducted in waves, approximately once every five years. Some countries were part of the survey only in a few waves, and some even appear only once, rendering the data highly unbalanced across countries and time. Worse yet, countries that were undergoing intense civil wars such as Congo or Afghanistan were less likely to be included in the survey study because of the security risks.[87] Between 1980 (the first wave) and 2022 (the last wave), there were 447 ethnic territorial war country-year observations but for only 32 of these WVS has trust observations (Table 1 below). Finally, the question used to measure social trust itself has problems; although it is now a classic and widely accepted, and it has received a fair amount of criticism about whether it is really binary, whether it measures the same thing across countries,[88] or whether it can really tap faith in others.[89]

For all these reasons, as a primary indicator of trust, I use a latent construct developed using a set of country-level correlates, such as polity score or inequality measure, instead of a single question asked in surveys.[90] Because it is a construct of

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[87] The full list of countries that were not surveyed while a civil war was ongoing or ever: Afghanistan, Angola, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan (-2011), Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, and South Yemen. In some of these countries, surveys were conducted years after civil war was over (Guatemala in 2004 and 2020) and in many there has only been one wave (e.g. Uganda, Nicaragua, Yemen, Palestine, Israel, etc.)

[88] Lars Torpe and Henrik Lolle, "Identifying Social Trust in Cross-Country Analysis: Do We Really Measure the Same?," *Social Indicators Research* 103, no. 3 (2011): 481–500.

[89] John Ermisch et al., "Measuring People's Trust," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 172, no. 4 (2009): 749–69.

[90] Justwan, Bakker, and Berejikian, "Measuring Social Trust and Trusting the Measure."

indicators measured annually, a more balanced dataset with observations for every year going back to 1949 is possible.[91] The latent measure of trust allows me to test my theory on a much larger spectrum, geographically and spatially. As additional proof of concept, I also estimated models with survey measures of trust as the dependent variable.

Table I. Incidence of wars in different datasets

	Ethnic territorial	**Ethnic governmental**	**Nonethnic territorial**	**Nonethnic governmental**
Number of civil war incidents using the latent measure of trust (1948-2009)	560	259	80	589
Number of civil war incidents between 1980 and 2022	447	274	91	459
Number of civil war incidents using WVS/EVS data for trust	32	9	3	20

Note: The unit of analysis is country-year. 560 means there are a total of 560 ethnic territorial wars in the country-year dataset, most of which are countries that had protracted wars running for decades.

Independent Variables

Intrastate armed conflict is defined as conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal rebel group.[92] GROW^{up}'s conflict data comes from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD)[93] and Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)

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[91] Authors use nine institutional correlates (e.g. the polity score, judicial independence), three social-psychological correlates (e.g. GINI coefficient, ethnic fractionalization), and two biological/environmental correlates (e.g. ratio of female population, degree of water pollution) Justwan, Bakker, and Berejikian, 4.
[92] Armed conflict is defined by UCDP as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."
[93] "Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook" (Oslo: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

dataset.[94] UCDP/PRIO defines four types of conflict: extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and internationalized internal. My focus is on the last two, which together forms intrastate armed conflict. ACD codes incompatibility within each conflict in two categories: government and territory. EPR dataset then adds the ethnic and nonethnic dimensions, coding whether ethnicity is central to recruitment and alliance structures.[95] The resultant four types of intrastate armed conflict are: ethnic governmental, ethnic territorial, non-ethnic governmental, and non-ethnic territorial. The variables I used for these four types show whether there is an ongoing conflict of that kind or not.

Between 1948 and 2009, 34 countries had ethnic territorial war, 34 countries had ethnic governmental war, 12 countries had nonethnic territorial, and 80 countries had nonethnic governmental war. Figure 3 shows annual distribution of each type of war. Ethnic territorial and nonethnic governmental wars are steadily the most frequently observed types of civil war, peaking in early 1990s.

All country-level control variables and aggregated trust measures from WVS/EVS are from the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset.[96] For the list and description of all control variables and summary statistics, see Appendix Section E and Table A 10.

(PRIO), 2015); Therése Pettersson et al., "Organized Violence 1989–2020, with a Special Emphasis on Syria," *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 4 (2021): 809–25.

[94] Wucherpfennig et al., "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War"; Manuel Vogt et al., "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1327–42.

[95] See p. 5 in the Appendix of Wimmer, Cederman, and Min "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set," *American Sociological Review* 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–37..

[96] Jan Teorell et al., "The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, Version Jan21. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.," 2021, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogstdjan21.



Figure 3. Annual distribution of wars

Empirical Strategy

I merge these three datasets (Latent trust, GROW^{up}, and QoG) and create a pooled crossnational time-series dataset spanning 169 countries between 1948-2009 for the latent trust and 1980-2017 for the WVS measure of trust. The data is hierarchical. Yearly observations from countries (time, t) are nested within countries (j).

The general model I seek to estimate is as follows:

$Y_{it} = \alpha + \gamma Y_{it-1} + \beta X_{it} + \eta_t + v_i + \varepsilon_{it}$

where Y_{it} is level of social trust in country i at time t,

X_{it} is the matrix of independent variables,

η_t is the linear time trend,

v_i is country-level fixed effects.

To control for autocorrelation, I include lagged dependent variable (t-1) in each of my estimates. Lagged dependent variables, however, are likely correlated with country fixed effects, which may result in biased estimates. In an attempt to overcome this potential bias, I fit a linear dynamic panel-data model which employs Arellano-Bond estimator where the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the lags of the dependent variable. Panel data allows to exploit change within countries over time to help eliminate unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, which decreases the chances of confounding.[97] Finally, I use robust standard errors—errors adjusted for clustering on country.

Lags of the independent variables deserve a theoretical note. When civil wars are coded as incidence for a year, they may not affect the social trust in the same year or even the next. Conflict builds over time; it takes years sometimes for violence to spread or for war narratives to become familiar. Effect of civil war incidence today may not reflect on interpersonal trust for some years. Thus, when estimating the impact of war on trust and checking robustness of the results, particularly for the survey measure of trust, I also used large time lags (5+ years), some of which was informed by availability of data as explained below.

Next, I fit the model on the data with WVS measures of trust. As mentioned

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[97] Lars Leszczensky and Tobias Wolbring, "How to Deal With Reverse Causality Using Panel Data? Recommendations for Researchers Based on a Simulation Study," *Sociological Methods & Research* Online first (2019); Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Second Edition* (MIT Press, 2010).

above, WVS was conducted in waves so there are much fewer observations when we used data from WVS (and EVS) as Table I shows. Given that in most contexts with an active conflict, WVS was not conducted, measures if available may be from many years after the conflict so I lagged the incidences of war variables accordingly. To decide how many years of lag to use in my estimations, I checked which lag from 1 to 10 would maximize the number of war observations so that there is more information for estimations. The model with the 8-year lag had the highest number of observations on all four types of civil conflict. I also calculated the time between waves in each country where there was at least two waves of World Values Survey data, and the average difference is 7.41 and including the EVS data it is 8.15. Heartened by the compatibility between these two separate observations, I used eight-year lags in estimations using WVS measure of trust.

Findings

Models 1-3 in Table 2 use latent trust and models 4 and 5 use the survey question on trust from WVS as the dependent variable (see Table A 11 for full output). All models show that nonethnic governmental wars (unrestricted) significantly decrease trust while ethnic territorial or any other type of war does not have a significant effect. This lends support to hypothesis 5. Countries that experienced nonethnic governmental wars are associated with a decrease in trust levels by 1.1 percentage points as compared to countries that did not have any nonethnic governmental wars, holding all other types of war experienced constant. Addition of control variables (political corruption, interstate war, GDP per capita, polity score, and ethnic fractionalization) as shown by model 2 do not change the results substantively. Figure 4 plots that the impact of nonethnic

governmental wars is more damaging than the impact of ethnic territorial wars on trust, in line with the hypothesis 6.

The coefficient for nonethnic governmental war is small but it is meaningful given that the latent trust variable, being a composite variable of slow-changing factors such as inequality or judicial independence, is itself a slow-changing variable. One year lagged latent trust unsurprisingly absorbs much of the variation in the dependent variable. (Model 1) The coefficient of the one-year lagged latent trust variable drops from was 0.724 to 0.527 when five-year lagged variable is included, which leaves much more room for unexplained variation. The coefficient of the lagged latent trust variable goes down as low as 0.211 when it is lagged 15 years (Model 5 in Appendix Table A 12). In models where the war variables are lagged 10 or 15 years, nonethnic governmental wars is estimated to reduce trust by 0.012 and 0.029 respectively (Model 4 and 5 in Appendix Table A 12).

That ethnic territorial wars have a consistently positive sign albeit having statistically unsignificant effect on trust in most of the models, may be capturing the ingroup trust among ethnic majority members. Assuming the support base for the rebels is the ethnic minority group and given that latent trust captures a more generalized notion of social trust, in ethnically polarized countries, the aggregated trust values may be more reflective of the trust levels of the ethnic majority members. As per my model, the trust for the outgroup members should decline, but there is no war-induced ground for the ethnic majority members' trust for the ingroup members to decline.

One concern with using a latent variable is that because the dependent variable itself is associated with conflict-related outcomes, the extent to which it shows changes in trust beyond the changes of conflict on society as reflected in reduced polity score or

reduced judicial independence etc. To address this concern, I used the alternative measure of trust from the WVS. Models using the WVS trust measure as DV also demonstrate the significant negative effect of nonethnic governmental wars on social trust and nonsignificant effects for all other types of wars.

Table A 12 in Appendix shows further robustness checks, using generalized least squares and stationarized the main war variables by differencing them i.e. ($X_{(t)}$-$X_{(t-1)}$) for the latent trust models and lagging the war variables by 10 or 15 years for all models. The results are robust to different modeling approaches.[98] Considering the noise in the data and the very low number of observations on the left side of the equation, these are powerful relationships, and they offer support for the part of the logic presented in the theory, a proof of concept.

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[98] I ran Hausman test to decide whether random or fixed effects would be better suited to analyze the panel data.



Figure 4. Effect of civil wars on generalized trust

Note:This figure is produced using Model 1 in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Civil Wars and Trust Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Latent trust	Latent trust	Latent trust	WVS trust	WVS trust
Latent trust lagged (one year)	0.844*** (0.013)	0.724*** (0.020)			
Latent trust lagged (five years)			0.527*** (0.008)		
Ethnic territorial war	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)			
Ethnic governmental war	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)			
Nonethnic territorial war	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)			
Nonethnic governmental war	**-0.011*** **(0.004)**	**-0.008+** **(0.004)**			
Ethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.002 (0.003)		
Ethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			-0.001 (0.005)		
Nonethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.008 (0.008)		
Nonethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			**-0.007*** **(0.003)**		
Ethnic terr. lagged (8 years)				0.000 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Ethnic gov. lagged (8 years)				-0.015 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.050)
Nonethnic terr. lagged (8 years)				-0.009 (0.042)	0.023 (0.048)
Nonethnic gov. lagged (8 years)				**-0.058*** **(0.025)**	**-0.049*** **(0.024)**
Constant	0.052*** (0.005)	-0.020 (0.038)	0.005 (0.009)	0.267*** (0.015)	0.341** (0.126)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Estimator	Arellano-Bond	Arellano-Bond	Gen. least squares	Ordinary least squares	Ordinary least squares
Random Effects Parameters					
Var(country-year)				-1.976*** (0.076)	-2.153*** (0.083)
Var(country)				-2.879 (30.335)	-2.862 (21.633)
Var(residual)				-3.452 (95.334)	-3.506 (78.397)
N(country-year)/(country)	8225/169	6958/146	6642/145	316/102	301/97

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001. Arellano-Bond is a linear dynamic panel-data estimator. In Models 4 and 5, multilevel mixed effects models are used.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Civil wars have afflicted states since the formation of nation-states. Virtually all nations have experienced a form of civil war. War inflicts damages to societal relations; and for recovery, trust— the core feature of social capital and functioning societies, is integral. I argue that the type of trust that is most undermined depends on the character of the war. I show that wars bound by identity and geography, such as ethnic territorial ones, undermine identity-based trust more while unbounded wars, such as nonethnic governmental wars, largely decrease broad generalized trust. A major hypothesis extending from my theory on the wartime transformation of trust is that nonethnic governmental wars should damage generalized trust more than ethnic territorial wars, and I test it using pooled cross-sectional data. Empirically, the paper is the first to identify how civil war transforms trust, using ethnographic fieldwork-based methods.

The theory proposes restrictions of war violence as the variable that explains changes in interpersonal trust relations but there is concern for endogeneity. Can changes in trust lead to onset of civil war violence? In the scholarship on civil war, political grievances (e.g. high degrees of group exclusion from state power, unequal representation, suppression of rights) and economic greed are proposed as primary drivers of identity and nonidentity wars respectively.[99] Sudden disruption of societal peace in the form of brewing intergroup tensions, often as a result of mobilization of group differences by the insurgency

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[99] Sambanis, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1)"; Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis," *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 87–119; Marie L. Besançon, "Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides," *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 4 (2005): 393–415; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set."

movement, can precede the onset of civil wars. Decrease in generalized trust may be a feature of the prewar social context however it is hardly a satisfactory explanation for the onset of civil war violence. Within the realm of trust, the most likely cause of violence would be the *mistrust in the institutions and political actors* (political trust) rather than in ordinary members of the public or outgroup (generalized trust).

Even in ethnic conflicts, deep-rooted tribal animosities are not a cause for onset of conflict unless carefully mobilized.[100] In reality, ethnic conflicts are not products of everyday encounters between individuals but rather outcomes of interactions between the state and organized armed groups that challenge state authority.[101] Many qualitative accounts in contexts that experienced civil war point out the rather harmonious co-existence of groups prior to the war. Even in areas like Yugoslavia which experienced high-level intergroup atrocities, prewar relations were described as rather peaceful even in heterogenous regions; different ethnic groups were neighbours and even friends.[102] Similar dynamics of "intimate enemies" where previously close individuals be it relatives, friends, colleagues, neighbours, were observed in Peru.[103] Lee Ann Fuji 's

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[100] Lee J. M. Seymour and Kathleen G. Cunningham, "Identity Issues and Civil War: Ethnic and Religious Divisions," in *What Do We Know about Civil Wars?*, ed. David T. Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, n.d.), 43–58.

[101] Andreas Wimmer, *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*, Book, Whole (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[102] Dinka Corkalo et al., "Neighbors Again? Intercommunity Relations after Ethnic Cleansing," in *My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 143–61; Duško Sekulić, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson, "Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 5 (2006): 797–827.

[103] Theidon, *Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru*.

famous book, “Killing Neighbors”, examining the joiners in the Rwandan genocide mentions similar dynamics.[104] And it is precisely the evaporation of such cordial trusting relations as a result of war violence that my theory focuses on.

Restrictions by geography and identity are critical characteristics shaping changes in trust relations as per the theory. However, there are other factors that can explain changes in trust relations in wartime other than geography and identity. For example, pattern of violence, i.e. configuration of repertoire, targeting, frequency, and technique an armed organization regularly engages in,[105] is a crucial factor that may determine how war violence changes interpersonal relations. But some of these elements are already integrated in the theory such as targeting: Wars restricted by identity should feature more collective forms of targeting based on group identities and thus undermine identity-based trust more. The repertoire, frequency and technique of violence will affect the brutality and severity of violence more than anything, and the recovery of the victims will be conditioned by the type of violence they were exposed to, whether it was terrorism, sexual violence or massacre of co-villagers, or whether family members were forcibly disappeared. For those who are not directly victimized, which are the group of interest in this paper, terror of such violence can induce fear and below I discuss how it may affect trust.

Terrorism is often observed as a violent strategy in civil wars,[106] and it can be

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[104] Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda*, 1st ed. (Cornell University Press, 2009), https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z7s5.
[105] Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “What Should We Mean by ‘Pattern of Political Violence’? Repertoire, Targeting, Frequency, and Technique,” *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 1 (2017): 20–41.
[106] Jessica A. Stanton, “Terrorism in the Context of Civil War,” *The Journal of Politics* 75,

employed even in restricted wars outside of the main theatres of conflict. The PKK, for example, occasionally engaged in bombings in densely populated provinces of Turkey *outside the separatist region* such as Istanbul and Antalya.[107] These type of indiscriminate targeting of civilians in urban spaces undoubtedly affect the psychology of the residents and the country at large yet the fear generated by such one-off events should be fleeting as long as they are not recurring, spread to a large geography, and small-scale. 9/11 as a single event have caused much anxiety for years to come due to its massive scale but often in contexts undergoing restricted civil war, terrorist attacks outside the territory at stake are significantly smaller events. Importantly, these types of rebel terrorism outside the separatist region are limited. As a matter of fact, Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data shows that 80% of the PKK terrorism was in the Kurdish territories. In Peru violence is much more widespread across the geography. Indeed, 36% of all Shining Path terrorist attacks were in the capital city Lima. Furthermore, as discussed above, the nature of the rebellion determine the geography, so separatist conflicts tend to stay in a delimited territory. My theory is about the most prevalent form and scope of violence rather than exceptions.

In addition, generalized trust reflects the trust-levels of the larger collective, rather than trust level of those who were directly victimized, so rather than the brutality the geographic reach of the violence and its identity focus is much more relevant. Should two wars be identical in terms of the restrictions of violence by geography and identity, the one that feature more lethal weapons or higher number of atrocities should undermine

no. 04 (2013): 1009–22.
[107] Stanton.

trust more. Nevertheless, variations in geography and identity-focus are more powerful to explain changes in trust.

The statistical analysis is limited because of availability of data. For a true test of the theory, it is necessary to have data on geographic spread of violence and degree of group relevance in each case of civil conflict. In the absence of such data, I use the most disaggregated coding of civil wars available, along the dimensions of territory and ethnicity, and controlled for a number of variables that may be related to both incidence of conflict and trust. There are many other variables that scholars have shown to determine violence in civil war. For example, Wood shows that insurgents with greater relative capabilities (control of territory, market, resource wealth, arms etc.) employ less violence than less capable insurgents.[108] Similarly, micro-level studies show that organizational characteristics or ideology of armed groups influence patterns of violence against civilians.[109] In the absence of data on these factors, estimating the extent to which geographic and identity-based restrictions in civil wars affect trust is challenging. Nevertheless, the findings are reassuring as a proof of concept showing that the hypothesized relationship between bounds of civil war and trust holds water. When data becomes available, testing whether the hypotheses for identity-based trust hold is also an important next step.

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[108] Reed M Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–14.

[109] Laia Balcells and Jessica A. Stanton, "Violence against Civilians during Armed Conflict: Moving beyond the Macro- and Micro-Level Divide," *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 45–69.

Another limitation is that the theory is focused on generalized trust and outgroup trust so it does not actually lay out how ingroup trust will change. Empirically my data does not show any evidence for increasing in-group trust. Theoretically, there is reason for ingroup trust to rise as I do not conceive decrease in outgroup trust to be a ground for an increase ingroup trust. Ingroup and outgroup trust can operate independently. Indeed, a study from Rwanda shows that while inter-ethnic trust between Tutsi and Hutu decreased with the onset of violence and sharply so for those targeted in the genocide but intra-ethnic trust among Tutsi remains largely unchanged. Importantly, the decline in trust was the same in those who were direct victims as those who were not exposed to violence but felt the collective threat based on their identities.[110] Yet, a study on wars in Africa find that exposure to violence reduces ingroup trust especially when individuals reside in ethnically homogenous locations.[111] In future studies, it may be interesting to examine the relationship between ingroup and outgroup trust in conflict settings.

My findings have significant implications, given how central trust is to conflict resolution, peace-building, stability, and development.[112] When left unaddressed, distrusting the "other" can be used to justify sustained injustice and aggression against the "other" group, which can breed new cycles of conflict.[113] Yet, achieving trust in

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[110] Bert Ingelaere and Marijke Verpoorten, "Trust in the Aftermath of Genocide: Insights from Rwandan Life Histories," *Journal of Peace Research* 57, no. 4 (2020): 521–35.
[111] Jacob S. Lewis and Sedef A. Topal, "Proximate Exposure to Conflict and the Spatiotemporal Correlates of Social Trust," *Political Psychology* 44, no. 3 (2023): 667–87.
[112] Thia M. Sagherian-Dickey, "The Importance of Trust in Achieving Positive Peace," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Positive Peace*, ed. Katerina Standish et al. (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 979–97.
[113] Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Socio-Psychological Barriers to Conflict Resolution," in *Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, Frontiers of Social Psychology (New York, NY, US:

postconflict contexts is very difficult. Clarifying the effect of civil wars on types of trust could be an important step in post-conflict peace building efforts. Given the argued relevance of character of war to the postwar intergroup relations, policies aimed at building and sustaining peace should take into account the kind of trust that is undermined. When generalized trust is undermined, investment in institutions and securing order may provide the best solution whereas when identity-based trust is undermined, designs to promote intergroup contact may be most fruitful. In Northern Ireland, building trust across religious identity lines via positive contact or perhaps social integration policies should be the prominent item in political agendas to bring together segregated communities.[114] In Colombia, on the other hand, institutions that target crime and boost security and peace dialogues with former FARC members as well as cultivating trust from below by facilitating cooperation may be much more effective to build generalized trust.[115] "The extension of trust is likely to be conditional and retractable, especially in societies coming out of protracted violent conflict."[116] Hence, it is critical to ensure the necessary tools are in place in the beginning of the peace-making process can start to generate long-lasting peace and keep new conflicts at bay.

Psychology Press, 2011), 217–39.

[114] Tania Tam et al., "Intergroup Trust in Northern Ireland," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35, no. 1 (2009): 45–59.

[115] Piotr Sztompka, "Two Theoretical Approaches to Trust; Their Implications for the Resolution of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Role of Trust in Conflict Resolution: The Israeli-Palestinian Case and Beyond*, ed. Ilai Alon and Daniel Bar-Tal, Peace Psychology Book Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 15–21.

[116] Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger MacGinty, "Introduction: Building and Breaking Trust," *The Round Table* 98, no. 403 (2009): 425.

APPENDIX

MS Title: Trust in Civil Wars: Wartime Transformations of Social Trust

Section A. Case Information

PKK and Sendero: The Characters of, the Threats Posed by, and the Military Responses to the Insurgencies

Both the PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and Sendero (Shining Path) are offshoots of leftist movements that were sweeping across the world in the late 1960s. Leaders of these movements (Abdullah Öcalan and Abimael Guzmán, respectively) were initially seeking a socialist revolution for all oppressed groups.[117] Yet, Öcalan decided to prioritize the Kurdish issue in the party's agenda the more he pondered the Kurdish problem and became familiar with the ideas of Kurdish nationalism. He believed in the necessity of a distinct Kurdish party when he decided that the Turkish left could not provide a solution.[118] Guzmán pursued his socialist goals yet decided to revamp the party following Maoist ideas.[119] His push for militarization, which was at odds with the party's general inclination, eventually led to a new and separate organization from the Communist party of Peru (PCP). Öcalan formed the PKK in 1978 with the Kurdish radicals or socialists who feel strongly about the Kurdish issue around a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and Guzmán formed a Maoist red faction with his loyalists within the PCP in 1970.

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[117] Öcalan was a prominent figure in the Turkish left, especially in the socialist revolutionary front party DHKP-C (*Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*-Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front. Guzmán was the chairman of the Ayacucho Committee of the Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista del Perú*-PCP). See Figure A 3 in Appendix C for their initial flags.

[118] David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[119] Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear* (London, UK: Latin American Bureau, 1992).

The PKK assumed an increasingly ethnic character and sought to appeal to ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Sendero, however, organized indigenous peasants around socialist goals but rejected politics or agendas revolving around indigenous identity. It is important to note that at no point in Sendero's armed struggle, the parties involved in the conflict could be clearly distinguished with respect to their ethnicity or class positions while the ethnic positioning of the parties in the case of the PKK were quite distinct.

Once the insurgent organizations had recruited and trained sufficient combatants, they initiated their armed struggle, both in the beginnings of a return to democratic rule from a military government. The PKK started its insurgency on 15 August 1984 with the Şemdinli and Eruh attacks, about a year after transition from military to civilian rule. The Shining Path launched its strategic offensive on the day of the first democratic election (May 17, 1980) after years of military rule (to be exact the first election since 1963). On the very eve of the elections, they burned ballot boxes in Chuschi, in the province of Huamanga, Ayacucho. The perpetrators were quickly caught and the event did not get much attention in the press. They also used some symbolic violence by hanging dogs (representing the dogs of the capitalist system) from lampposts and blowing up Velasco's tomb. Next, on the patriotic celebration of Independence Day, July 28, they placed bombs on the parade route in Lima. In Ayacucho, explosive attacks targeting government buildings and cooperatives and assassinations of local officials were launched.[120] Still in fledgling stage, the transitioning elected governments did not pay much heed to the insurgent attacks at the outset. The then Turkish prime-minister

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[120] Kevin G. Barnhurst, "Contemporary Terrorism in Peru: Sendero Luminous and the Media," *Journal of Communication* 41, no. 4 (1991): 75–89.

Turgut Özal, and Peruvian president Belaúnde dismissed the guerillas as "bandits" (surprisingly using extremely similar denigrating phrases in respective languages: "*üç beş çapulcu*" in Turkish and "*un grupo de abigeos*" in Spanish, denoting literally a few looters/cattle rustlers). Because the threat posed by the incipient insurgencies was initially not taken seriously initially, and because not much importance was accorded to the population under attack (Kurdish and indigenous), the states delayed deploying commensurate military means to thwart further attacks and practically allowed the groups to grow. In the case of Peru, the previously ousted president Belaúnde was reluctant to empower the military lest the army take over civilian politics again.[121] In Turkey, most authorities believed that the insurrections were remnants of the coup d'état and were not serious.[122]

The PKK initially was waging a secessionist war —indeed until the capture of Öcalan, an independent Kurdistan was the only and ultimate goal. The existential threat it posed to the territorial integrity of Turkey is the foundation of the collective threat the society felt. The collective threat Sendero posed was to the state and the regime, rather than to the territory or any other significant part of the Peruvian state's identity.

The PKK's guerrilla war was fought with an army deployed at a mountain base and has almost exclusively been rural-based — the attempted urban insurrections had largely failed until 2015— and been effectively concentrated in the border zones in the

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[121] Carlos I. Degregori, "The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views," in *Shining Path of Peru*, ed. David S. Palmer, Book, Section vols. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 33–58; Gordon H. McCormick, "The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (1987): 109–26; David S. Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Orin Starn, Carlos I. Degregori, and Robin Kirk, *The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995)..

[122] Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence* (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 83.

Southeastern Turkey because the dispute was over the Kurdish territories. Sendero waged a popular guerrilla warfare for its revolutionary ideological motives in the rural in the initial years of the insurgency and embarked upon urban guerrilla campaign towards late 1980s. Its popular army was composed of civilians who were armed with primitive weapons (e.g. machetes, knives, spears).

In PKK's overall warfare strategy, indiscriminate targeting is very rare except for 1996 when PKK employed indiscriminate civilian targeting.[123] Beside the residents in these cities of Turkey that were most exposed to violence, it was the families of soldiers or soldiers to be that felt personal threat most strongly, worrying that their kids may be assigned to an Eastern province because of compulsory military conscription. The relatively random nature of the location assignments for the military duty and obligatory Eastern service for civil servants contributed to the anxiety.[124] Beyond the indirect threat, the PKK did not directly pose a tangible threat to individual security for individuals outside of the Eastern Turkey. Unlike the civil war in Peru, indiscriminate civilian killings were also not a pervasive strategy in the ethnic war in Turkey.

The two insurgent groups were also different in terms of the brutality of their violence. Sendero employed extremely violent methods to exterminate opponents, castigate the dissidents and instill fear, which is well aligned with one of the most fundamental elements to its discourse: "cult of death" as Degregori [125] calls it. Emphasis

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[123] Jessica A. Stanton, "Terrorism in the Context of Civil War," *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 04 (2013): 1009–22.
[124] see Leonie Huddy et al., "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 593–608.
[125] "The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path," ed. David E. Apter, The Legitimization of Violence (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 33–82.

on "blood" and metaphors of "rivers flowing blood" were heavily employed to underscore the importance of sacrifice of lives for triumph of socialism as well as negation of human life. The element of brutality and indiscrimination in Sendero's strategy of violence may have further enhanced the fear and intimidation attached to the popular level threat in Peru.

The PKK, in contrast, was considerably less aggressive and violent, which most likely factored in the perception of popular threat. Substantive support for this observation comes from the total number of fatalities: The total number of fatal victims in Peru was estimated to be around 75,000 people, and Sendero was held responsible for 46% of them. While in Turkey, whose population is almost three times larger than Peru, the approximate number of victims is around 40,000 including state killings (see Table A 1). In both contexts, the state was involved in civilian targeting (heavy majority was indigenous), yet in Peru the episode of "Dirty War" (1983-1985 in particular) featured excessive abuse of power wielded by the armed forces.

Both countries responded to the insurgencies with a delay, yet the response was much less coordinated and systematic in Peru than in Turkey. In Peru, the duty of confronting the Sendero militants was first assigned to the Police. But police forces were insufficient to impede the violence of Sendero. Eventually in December 1982, Belaúnde declared a state of emergency in eight provinces of Peru and put armed forces in charge in those areas. In the interim, Sendero had advanced its agenda tremendously. Guerrilla groups, building on their pre-existing support from the students and teachers in the region, carried out moralization campaigns and continued to spread their message.[126] The newly

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[126] Carlos I. Degregori, *El Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho 1969-1979* (Lima: Instituto de

assigned police forces (*Sinchis*, a special unit of the Peruvian Civil Guard) committed many abuses in their counterinsurgency tactics, such as beating and torturing the suspected *Senderista*s, but these brutal methods did little to prevent the rise of Sendero.

Militia groups in the conflict zones were instrumental for fostering solidarity among the groups that did not have the means to relocate. In Peru, coercing peasant communities to organize self-defence committees (*comités de autodefensa*) was one of the wartime counterinsurgency strategies. In the hot zones where the military deemed these units absolutely necessary, peasants did not have a choice; neutrality was not an option. Resistance signified being *Senderista*. These groups were later called *rondas campesinas*, borrowing from the established structures of autonomous peasant vigilante committees in Cajamarca. The military encouraged these groups to defend themselves by mobilizing all their resources. Militarization of these communities at times led to disasters (see the Uchuraccay massacre).[127] For the most part, they did not have effective and sufficient weapons to systematically resist Sendero. To strengthen them, President García and then Fujimori issued an order to arm these groups, which gained legal recognition by promulgation in 1991. Beside the ones formed by the army, some other communities voluntarily organized *rondas campesinas* and demonstrated support for the counterinsurgency. *Rondas* rose in number from 700 in 1989 to 1200 in 1991, particularly concentrated in the Andean departments of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Junín, Huancavelica and Pasco.[128] They proved successful in dispelling Sendero on many

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estudios peruanos, 1990); Carlos I. Degregori et al., *Las Rondas Campesinos y La Derrota de Sendero Luminoso* (Peru: IEP, 1996).

[127] On January 26, 1983, eight journalists were brutally killed by almost a hundred peasants (with machetes) as they were mistaken for guerillas.

[128] Orin Starn, *Hablan Los Ronderos: La Búsqueda Por La Paz En Los Andes* (Lima: IEP, 1993).

occasions yet also abused their power to settle personal disputes.[129] In Turkey, between 1984 and 1999, when martial law and later the state of emergency (introduced in 1987) were in force across most of the cities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, many Kurdish residents, especially those living in the hot conflict zone, were practically presented with two choices: taking up the role of village guards [*korucu*] to collaborate with the government as paramilitaries, or "resettling." Both options were unappealing to many. Those who were reluctant to become village guards[130] were forced to abandon their homes and land, and displace, either under direct orders or as a result of intense counter-guerilla attacks by the army, in violation of their constitutional rights.

After years of struggle, Sendero was effectively dissolved when Abimael Gúzman was captured in 1992. In Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK, was captured in 1999, and the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002. The power balance within domestic politics and vis-à-vis the PKK changed a lot following the imprisonment of Öcalan. Armed struggle paused between 1999 and 2004 and resumed more fiercely afterwards.

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[129] These civilian militias became specific targets for Sendero from their very first inception onwards. They were the epitome of much despised peasant collaboration with the government. Determined to punish the members of these committees, Sendero committed mass atrocities. The Lucanamarca massacre on April 3, 1983 was one of the bloodiest incidences in the history of the armed struggle, when sixty-nine peasants were murdered.

[130] In many interviews, people reported that they did not want to be armed and fight against guerilla forces who included their relatives, neighbours or even brothers. They perceived the village guard position as betrayal to the family.

Brief History and Military Culture in Turkey and Peru

Turkey and Peru have seldom been studied in a comparative fashion in political science. This may not come as a surprise given their regional and historical differences, yet a closer look at their contemporary history and social structure would reveal that they are more similar than different. Turkey and Peru are multi ethnic countries, featuring one group dominating over the other. The subordinate groups enjoyed significantly different status vis-à-vis the empires they were ruled by: the Kurds in Ottoman Empire were granted autonomy and functioned as an independent principality while the indigenous people in Peru were practically slaves during the Spanish empire rule. The contemporary history of Kurds in Turkey and indigenous groups in Peru nevertheless show striking parallels. Policies of assimilation (*mestizaje*[131] in Peru reflecting the entrenched racism,[132] and *Turkification* in Turkey reflecting the overarching nationalism), endemic subjugation and repression of subordinate ethnic groups define the cornerstones in the histories of both countries.

An important difference between Turkey and Peru concerns their military professionalism and military tradition, which further explains the national unity differences between the two countries. "Military professionalism" encapsulates expertise, responsibility, corporateness, and ideology, all of which were missing in not only the Peruvian military but also many other Latin American military establishments.[133]

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[131] *Mestizaje* is the idea of gradual evolution of Indians by rejecting and discarding their culture and language and taking on the dominant culture.
[132] Marisol De la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991*, Book, Whole (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).
[133] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), Ch.1.

Although both Turkey and Peru had military conscription and citizen-armies, the scope and interpretation of militarism in Peru were starkly different. Historically, common soldiers in Peru were poor and illiterate Indians, blacks, and *castas* (mixed races), and the length of service hinged on the military necessity.[134] The contemporary conscription policy entails a two-year service term for males between 20 and 25 years, and the conscripts constitute most of the army's manpower today.[135] However, racial discrimination played a big part in the history of military conscription in Peru; forced recruitment only applied to the relatively poor indigenous Peruvian males.[136] In Turkey, on the other hand, the mandatory military duty is sanctified and heavily ingrained in the understanding of citizenship; sacrifice of life for the nation is exalted above all else (as discussed above).[137] In Peru, the notion of dying for one's nation lacks the holiness it holds in Turkey. Given the composition of the military (mostly indigenous) and the longstanding distrust toward the armed forces, the deaths of soldiers in battle also has failed to exhort much reaction from the Peruvian public.

The soldiers who fought during the Independence of Peru were not military professionals, and the Peruvian national army in the mid-nineteenth century was ill-organized; hence, the conditions for establishing a corporate identity in the military were not ripe. Peru had neither the necessary facilities to train military officers nor a

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[134] Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso*, vol. 111 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).

[135] By law, women were required to register for obligatory military service and could be called up between the ages of eighteen and forty-five for two-year terms. As of 1991, however, this had never been done. In the army, women served only in civilian capacities, such as secretaries, clerks, and nurses.

[136] see Eduardo González-Cueva, "Conscription and Violence in Peru," *Latin American Perspectives* 27, no. 3 (2000): 88–102.

[137] Miltiary duty in Turkey is also commonly associated with masculinity and seen as the first step to "manhood."

systematic recruitment system. Consequently, the military also did not have a clear sense of mission.[138]

In Turkey, military conscription for all males above the age of 18 has always been strictly enforced, notwithstanding some exceptions of so-called "paid military service." [139] About 60% of the military force currently consists of conscripts— i.e. they are the backbone of the army, outnumbering the professionals.[140] Military duty is sanctified and heavily ingrained in the understanding of citizenship; sacrifice of life for the nation is exalted.[141] In Peru, two-year conscripts (males between 20-25 years) similarly constitute most of the army's manpower.[142] However, racial discrimination played a big part in the history of military conscription; forced recruitment only applied to the relatively poor indigenous Peruvian males. Dying for the nation was not promoted as a holy concept as widely in Peru.

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[138] Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso*.

[139] It denotes an opportunity to 'buy out' the compulsory military service for a specified amount (usually around US$10,000) by an amendment in the Enlistment law in times of deficit in budget. It is usually for people who are above a certain age, varies between 25 and 30 years old (who has been postponing their service for education reasons or for residing in another country). Between 1980-2002, it has been enacted four times in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2002.

[140] Retrieved on May 7, 2023 from: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/turkey-compulsory-military-service-buy-exemption.html

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[142] By law, women were required to register for obligatory military service, and could be called up between the ages of eighteen and forty-five for two years. As of 1991, this had never been done. In the army, women served only in civilian capacities, such as secretaries, clerks, and nurses.

Antecedents of the Conflicts: History of Sociopolitical Suppression

The insurgencies in Turkey and Peru were products of the political history. The nation-building policies not only shaped the nature and the character of the insurgencies but also the dynamics and the outcomes of the insurgencies. In Turkey, the discourse of national unity and fixation on the territorial unity brought about the Kurdish revolt. In Peru, the lack of cohesive and coherent ethnic consciousness among the indigenous groups, the racialized geographies, and entrenched racism not only paved the way for the insurgency and casted its the Maoist nature, but also reflected on how the war played out, how it was perceived by the elites, and ultimately on how trust changed as a result of the war.

History of Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic

Kurds have lived in the geographic region stretching from upper Mesopotamia (referring roughly to contemporary south-Eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, north-eastern Syria) and to northern Iran. Some of the Kurdish territories were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the years 1514 to 1517. When the Ottoman empire collapsed at the end of the World War I (WWI), Kurds were promised a scheme of local autonomy with a prospect of independence in the predominantly Kurdish areas by the Treaty of Sevres (1920). On the other side, the National Resistance Movement organized by the Ottoman Turks was promoting the idea of a new sovereign state for Ottoman Muslim populations.[143] Even though Turkish national identity was strongly embraced in this movement, Kurds opted for fighting along with the Turks for independence in the post-

[143] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).

WWI wars. Yet, once the Independence War was won and the Turkish Republic was established (in 1923), the Kurds realized that self-rule of ethnic communities at the local level was off the agenda, and that they had been simply absorbed in the new Turkish nation.

Two major developments in the early Republic in Turkey sparked the onset of the Kurdish struggle. First, the constitution drafted in 1924 defined all the citizens as "Turkish" and did not mention other ethnicities. It stipulates that: "The people of Turkey, regardless of religion or ethnicity, is regarded as Turk in respect of citizenship."[144] In the same year, the institution of Caliphate was abolished. The caliphate was important for binding the multi-ethnic Muslim groups. It was especially for Muslim ethnic groups (particularly Kurds) in the periphery for it allowed space for local autonomy for the periphery through strong roles Sheiks had in the system.[145] Kurds' allegiance to the new Republic, in a sense, hinged on the institution of Caliphate and promises for local autonomy while for Ataturk and his loyalists, the Caliphate was the biggest impediment before a secular and modern regime, and local autonomy for ethnic groups was a threat to the national unity.

Suppression of other identities than "Turkish," and abrupt secularization resulted in a backlash from the Kurdish population. Kurdish uprisings commenced with the famous Sheikh Said in 1925.[146] There are still debates regarding the nature of the

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[144] The first clause of the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution states: "*Türkiye ahalisine din ve ırk farkı olmaksızın vatandaşlık itibariyle Türk itlak olunur*."
[145] Hakan M. Yavuz, "Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7, no. 3 (2001): 1–24; Mesut Yeğen, "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007): 119–51.
[146] This was the first organized insurrection against the newly formed Turkish Republic. However, Kurdish revolts date back to Ottoman era. Sheikh Ubeydullah's uprisal in 1870 is known as the first nationalist revolt. There were also other small-scale rebellions at the level of tribes.

rebellion; some suggest that it was religious in origin, some argue that it was a revolt to reclaim Kurdish identity, and yet others contend that both were at play.[147] Whatever the true incendiary cause was, it was a reaction to the project of establishing a modern nation-state by imposing new identities and new life styles. The first attempt to revolt against the state resulted in heavy crackdown by the military forces and execution of the leader.

The Turkish state, determined to obviate any further similar insurgencies, took some strict measures, the reverberations of which persists today. The East Reform Plan, *Şark Islahat Planı*, being the most potent of all, was the first official step to assimilate Kurds, and "Turkify" *(Türkleştirme)* the Kurdish region via means of education, transportation, restructuration of cities, and new administrative regulations.[148] The plan, practically speaking, formed the framework of the state policies towards the Kurdish issue, the gist of which was denial and persecution of the Kurdish identity.

Prior to full operationalization of the Reform Plan, many follow-up Kurdish uprisings transpired in the following decade, varying in scope. The second major uprising occurred in Dersim, in response to the notorious Resettlement Law of 1934, passed to induce cultural homogeneity. It ended with a big blow from the state forces to strengthen the state authority and break the extant feudal ties.[149] In 1935, a law (No. 2884) was passed to dismantle the tribal structure of the area, to "civilize" the inhabitants, and to change the name of the region from Dersim to a Turkish one: Tunceli.

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[147] Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan*, Book, Whole (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1978).
[148] Mesut Yegen, "'Prospective-Turks' or 'Pseudo-Citizens:' Kurds in Turkey," *The Middle East Journal* 63, no. 4 (2009): 597–615.
[149] The extent of the state killings was perceived as a "massacre" and culminated in genocide controversy.

Restrictions on the use of Kurdish were part of the strategy towards the obliteration of Kurdish identity, which was considered to be at the root of these insurrections. Soon after the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, the government heralded a campaign to dissuade people to use any other language but Turkish with a slogan of "Citizen, Speak Turkish" (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş*). In 1944, Law No. 7267 stipulated that "village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee".[150] As a consequence of this policy, between 1940 and 2000, the names of more than 12,000 villages mostly in the Eastern region. Approximately one third of all villages were changed to a Turkish name.

With the liberation of the political space in the 1960s and increasing expressions of Kurdish identity, further measures were taken towards the goal of suppressing the Kurdish identity. In 1961, Law No. 298 forbid the use "any other language or script than Turkish in propaganda disseminated in radio or television as well as in other election propaganda" (Article 58). With reference to this law, many prominent Kurdish intellectuals critical of state policies were arrested and resettled. Analogously, the Turkish Workers' Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which was voicing concerns over the ban of Kurdish language, was banned on pretext of "encouraging separatist activities" in 1971.[151] In 1983, a new and more comprehensive legal prohibition was introduced by the military regime on the use of Kurdish language with Law No. 2932. The prohibition

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[150] Joost Jongerden, "Crafting Space, Making People: The Spatial Design of Nation in Modern Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 10 (2009): 10.
[151] Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), 17.

came into effect a month before they turned the power back to a civilian government, supplementing the new constitution (1982) which further engraved the nationalist elements of Turkish identity and state.[152] This new law forbade the use of any language but Turkish "as a mother tongue," and banned publishing in any language other than Turkish, and it stayed in effect till 1991.

In summary, the draconian rule of the state to ensure cultural and national homogeneity, fostering a culture of fear and relative conformism in the Eastern part prevailed through the 1990s. Stipulations of displacement and forced resettlement to rearrange the demographic structure of Turkey and "dilute" the concentration of Kurds, and the de facto and de jure language bans were the most blatant strategies to the assimilation end, which were interpreted as "an attack on the social space where-in Kurdishness is constituted".[153] The atmosphere of fear further induced de-politicization of Kurds. The generation of Kurds that has witnessed the cruel suppression of dissent was conditioned to "behave." The Turkish state resorting to its military power established itself as the only authority that makes the rules of the game. Many Kurds truly embraced the imposed national identity of the state and abided by the rules. They also raised their kids with the same ideology and stayed away from the politicized groups. The few decades following the brutal suppression of Dersim uprising were quiet in terms of identity rebellions. Until the burgeoning of leftist movements for equality, rights and freedom in the late 1960s, there was no noteworthy legal or illegal organized Kurdish movement.

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[152] For the Turkish original of the 1982 Constitution and a description of all the amendments to date see (Retrieved on May 5, 2017): http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constitution.htm
[153] Yeğen, "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question," 226.

History of Indigenous People in the Social and Political Structure of Peru

Peru proclaimed its independence from the Spanish Empire, transitioning from colonial viceroyalty to a postcolonial republic in 1821, and the dynamics between the natives[154] and the Spanish colonizers dominated the postcolonial politics. Spanish colonizers classified all indigenous groups all under the single "Indian" category, which they perceived to be inferior to Spaniards. The "superiority" of Spaniards most likely originated from their ruler status over the colonized subjects and their Catholicism rendered them closer to God.

Being "intrinsically inferior," the native people were relegated to a subordinate position by the Spaniard colonizers in economic and social life. The colonial economic structure was agrarian and built on a system of economic exploitation whereby landowners and mineowners were *criollo*s and peasant labour were the *Indio*s (Indian), who composed the highest and lowest social class respectively.[155] "*Creole*" denoted people of European (principally Spanish) ancestry who were born in Peru.[156] "*Mestizos*" were the middle category in the colonial caste system, referring to a mixed race— one parent of indigenous origin and one of Spanish or creole origin.

The chasm between the ruling *mestizo* oligarchy in the center and subordinated indigenous publics in the peripheries was a strong defining feature of the colonial chapter of Peru, which spilled over to the post-independence era. The two "incompatible

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[154] Broadly speaking Andeans and the Amazonians were the two major indigenous groups. The Andeans, semantically refer to the natives people of Andean highlands, were the major indigenous group at the time of the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors in the region, composed of native Quechua- and Aymara-speaking peoples.
[155] Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Challenging the Nation-State in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1992): 421–40.
[156] Rosemary Thorp and Maritza Paredes, *Ethnicity and the Persistence of Inequality: The Case of Peru* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

republics—one coastal, white, and modern, the other mountainous, Indian, and backward," and concomitant geographical and cultural divisions plagued Peru throughout its Republican history, impeding national unity.[157]

Indigenous aristocrats occasionally challenged the Spanish oligarchic rule with small-scale uprisings, but these were to no avail until late 18th century. The counter-hegemonic rebellion of Túpac Amaru in 1781 against the Bourbon reforms, which proved to be the largest and most influential movement, had immense effects on the *criollo* elite, but not in the direction the insurgents were hoping for. The massive scale of Túpac Amaru's revolt (also known as the Great Rebellion), though defeated and brutally repressed, left a deep mark on creole memory and perception of the Indians. Having lost their trust in the indigenous peoples, the colonial state gradually wiped out indigenous aristocracy lest an incident of a similar kind repeat itself. This insecurity of the ruling elites vis-à-vis Indians and their fear of being dominated by them would determine their attitude for many years to come.

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) that was fought among Peru, Chile and Bolivia over the resource-rich Atacama Desert (Guano and nitrate were hot commodities in the Peruvian political economy at the time)[158]—would aggravate the Indian problem for the Peruvian state. Not only did Peru lose devastatingly to Chile but also factional divide within the Peruvian elites resulted in a civil war and then numerous indigenous uprisings ensued right after. Though indigenous peoples fought in the war against the

[157] Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 150.
[158] For a comprehensive study of guano's role in Peruvian economic history, see José M. Rodriguez Montoya, "Historia de Los Contratos Del Guano y Sus Efectos En Las Finanzas Del Peru," *Economista Peruano* 13, no. 6 (1921): 85–129.

Chilean army by forming resistance armies in the highlands, indigenous peoples were portrayed as the reason behind the failure retrospectively.

Losing the war attested to the failure of Limañean (from Lima) oligarchy in nation-building. The rhetoric of indigenous as "traitors" also further tainted the image of indigenous peoples in the eyes of the creoles, epitomizing the "Hispanista" discourse. Though granted equal citizenship in the Constitution of 1823, indigenous people were stripped of franchise after the War of the Pacific,[159] and remained disenfranchised until 1979 by the Spanish literacy requirement. In summary, the indigenous peoples were effectively excluded from the "national projects" of the nineteenth century.[160]

With the fast growth of the coastal economy (light manufacturing, steel production and fish-meal processing) and promotion of Lima as the political and economic center, the *sierra* and more so the *selva* (the Amazons) was consigned to "malign state neglect".[161] While the coast developed with market capitalism and free-trade liberalism and became modernized, the *sierra* lagged behind, maintained traditional feudal economic structures, and perpetuated agrarian class relations.

The institution of "*gamonalismo,*" referring to domination by local power holders (petty *hacendados* (landowner), *gamonales* (provincial authorities) and rural *caudillos*),[162] perpetuated the colonial system of exploitation, and fostered clientelism. The now double-layered subordination of indigenous communities, both by the central

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[159] Electoral law of 1895 restricted the vote to the literate population.
[160] David Nugent, "Building the State, Making the Nation: The Bases and Limits of State Centralization in 'Modern' Peru," *American Anthropologist* 96, no. 2 (1994): 333–69.
[161] Jaymie Heilman, *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 9.
[162] Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910*.

and the local power structures, aggravated their plight. Against this advance of subjugation, everything from expansion of commercial *haciendas* and state neglect to complaints about abusive local authorities, indigenous revolts proliferated throughout all the regions of the *sierra* (Cusco, Puno, Arequipa, Ayacucho etc.).

In practice, indigenous peoples continued to exist with their distinct language and culture, while the chasm between indigenous peoples and "Peruvians" kept enlarging. Also, mixed-race *mestizo*s were not a unified group and did not embody the national identity.[163] Efforts to integrate the indigenous people into the nation-state culminated in *indigenismo*, which had permeated state policies over the years yet proved to be unsuccessful in eliminating the rift between the *mestizo*s and the indigenous groups. This rift between the two groups, failure of national integration, and centralism also contributed to "the inability and unwillingness of state managers to penetrate the society beyond Lima".[164]

In summary, the centralized government in Lima could not manage to unify the fragmented population but rather aggravated the existing cleavages. The concentration of the polity and economy on Lima and the coast went hand in hand with geographic, ethnic and economic marginalization of the *sierra* as well as political exclusion. The cultural and ethnic divisions intersecting with social classes persisted to the benefit of the dominant classes and to the detriment of a collective Peruvian identity.[165]

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[163] Degregori, "The Maturation of a Cosmocrat and the Building of a Discourse Community: The Case of the Shining Path."
[164] Maxwell A. Cameron and Philip Mauceri, *The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy* (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2006), 238.
[165] Julio Cotler, *Clases, Estado y Nación En El Perú*, vol. 17 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios peruanos, 1978).

Section B

B1. Qualitative Data Collection

The research was approved by a North American University Behavioural Ethics Board, Certificate Number H12-00452, Certificate Number H12-03711 (and the renewal Certificate Number H1-03711-A001). I conducted 12 expert interviews in Lima, 10 in Ayacucho, 6 in Cusco, and 5 in Cajamarca. I held 22 in-depth interviews with ordinary people in Lima, 12 in Ayacucho, 14 in Cusco, 5 in Cajamarca, 8 in Arequipa, and 5 in Iquitos (see Table A 2 for details). The distribution of focus groups was as follows: 6 groups in Lima, 3 in Cusco, 3 in Cajamarca, 3 in Iquitos, 2 in Tarapoto, and 2 in Ayacucho. In those cities, I conducted minimum of one focus group with adult men only and one with adult women only. In those cities where I held more than two focus groups, I conducted one with youth (18-25), and, in some cases, one mixed-gender adult group. In the capital city of Lima, I conducted two with adult men, two with adult women, and two with youth (see Table A 3 for details).

In Turkey, I conducted 15 focus groups: 3 in İstanbul, 4 in Ankara, 3 in Diyarbakır, 2 in Gaziantep, and 3 in Şanlıurfa. Focus groups were composed of 6 to 10 people varying in age and gender. Also, I completed 46 expert interviews and 92 in-depth interviews with ordinary people. The distribution of the expert interviews was as follows: 8 in İstanbul, 8 in Ankara, 10 in Diyarbakır, 8 in Şanlıurfa, 8 in Mardin, and 4 in Mersin. The distribution of the in-depth interviews with ordinary people was as follows: 12 in İstanbul, 15 in Ankara, 20 in Diyarbakır, 13 in Şanlıurfa, 12 in Mersin, 10 in Gaziantep, and 10 in Mardin (See Table A 4 and Table A 6 for details).

The length of my interviews varied between 45 minutes and 4 hours, averaging

about 90 minutes. Focus groups were on average 2 hours long. 85 percent of all my conversations were audio-recorded; in the other fifteen percent of the subjects did not consent to being recorded (21 people in Turkey, and 13 people in Peru).

All interviews and focus groups began with participants consenting to the protocol (usually oral consent was granted rather than written). All interviews and focus groups began with participants consenting to the protocol (usually oral consent was granted rather than written). At the beginning of every interview, I introduced myself as a Ph.D. candidate from a North American University and underscored the independence of my research and the purpose of it. I also reiterated that, as per the consent form, they had the right to choose what goes in the recording, end the interview at any moment, and reserve to right to decline answering any of my questions.

Sometimes establishing rapport took longer than usual, and without rapport the answers tended to be brief and uninformative. For instance, with the Kurdish respondents, it was a bit hard to establish rapport sometimes because they would usually guess I am not Kurdish and would hesitate to open up. As Leech says, rapport is much more than putting the respondent at ease; "it means convincing people that you are listening, that you understand and are interested in what they are talking about, and that they should continue".[166] Making sure that no judgment or threat could be interpreted to be in my phrasing or body language when it came to sensitive questions, I sometimes consciously extended the initial part of the interview, where I ask nonthreatening or less sensitive questions. In order to make the interviewees feel comfortable, I would sometimes start

[166] Beth L. Leech, "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews," *Political Science & Politics* 35, no. 04 (2002): 665.

with stories or a very general question, what Spradley (1979) calls "grand tour questions" such as "where they grew up and how the local life was back then".[167] I also changed the way I pronounced "PKK" depending on the subject in order to avoid causing any offense. The Kurdish pronunciation reads the letter "k" as "kay" while the Turkish pronunciation reads it as "ka" (as in "karate"), and, in today's politics, the pronunciation of "PKK" pronunciation can be a simple cue to signal one's side or camp.

I resorted to "soaking and poking" (heavy immersion in the details of a case) to get an insider perspective, familiarize myself with the world of the respondent, and ensure the content validity of my interviews, which, since they were based on open-ended questions, were sometimes lengthy and hard to replicate. In order to overcome this reliability issue, I increased the size of my sample, fell back on my prompts quite often, and made sure to ask the same questions in every interview, even if in a different order.

The participants had a range of experiences: some were ex-guerillas, many were victimized by war, some were discriminated against based on their ethnicity, some were forcibly displaced (and these experiences were not necessarily mutually exclusive), and some were not affected (these people were the main focus of my inquiry). The storylines and insights offered by the participants differed greatly, and in order to integrate all these diverse narratives, I carefully tailored my questions to each subject. To alleviate any discomfort around sensitive issues, I would break up my inquiry into segments that I scattered throughout the course of the interview, thus lessening the intensity of the questioning. At times, interviewees had extraordinary experiences or unique insights to share, and I would form new questions on the spot to follow-up on those cues. At other

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[167] as cited in Leech, 667.

times, they would use a certain vernacular, and, when I was not sure what a particular word or phrase meant, I would follow up, ensuring equivalence of meaning between researcher and subject.[168] The semi-structured format of the interview enabled me to revisit a question later if the respondent diverged from a cue that I had wanted to follow-up on (see Section D for the interview guides).

I paid due diligence to the security concerns some respondents had regarding the expression of certain opinions. In Peru, where the conflict is long over, the participants did not indicate experiencing any tangible fear in expressing their views. In Turkey, however, because the conflict is still ongoing, extracting honest and unfiltered responses was more of a challenge. Misrepresentation of personal opinions out of concerns for one's security is especially a risk in an ongoing civil war setting.[169] Nevertheless, 2014 was an exceptionally peaceful year to conduct a conflict research in Turkey, as the peace process was under way (2013–2015), and, thanks to the armistice, the political situation was very calm. It was five years after the Kurdish Initiative, which extended rights and freedoms to Kurds starting in 2009, and the Kurdish participants were more comfortable than ever before to talk about "taboo" subjects such as their identities or sympathy for the PKK. They were also extremely eager to talk about the past and tell their stories, experiences, and sufferings. Both in Peru and in Turkey, many of my subjects mentioned at the end of the interview that "the interview was cathartic."[170]

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[168] Margaret D. LeCompte and Judith Preissle Goetz, "Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research," *Review of Educational Research* 52, no. 1 (1982): 31–60.
[169] Elisabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[170] During the course of my field research, I took every measure necessary to ensure the privacy, confidentiality, and security of my respondents as per my ethical obligation. I kept the audio recordings in a secure, password-protected bag, with the field notes carried with me at all times.

Elected officials in Turkey were especially eager to give me the official state narrative without offering any additional useful input. In such cases, it required more prodding than average to get a personal response, as the subjects typically circumvented the question with politically correct rhetoric. In Peru, the public was more used to the practice of talking about the past, especially in conflict-ridden zones thanks to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC or "CVR") work. The Commission sought to unearth the truth by drawing on almost seventeen thousand testimonies and construct a new historical narrative—an alternative to the official accounts.[171] In Peru, I had the advantage of both immense amount of data already gathered and the public's comfort with talking about the past.

My fieldwork in both countries was very immersive and rich; it was semi-ethnographic in nature. In Peru, I lived with local families except for my first two months in Lima, but even then I was hosted by many locals and carried on my research outside of the formal settings of focus group or structured interviews. I had numerous informal conversations with locals on politics throughout my time in the country. They shared their experiences and told me stories from their past pertaining to the times of conflict. In Turkey, I had more advantages being Turkish myself. I had the opportunity to be present during casual political conversations at dinner tables or on Sunday brunches. Even after my planned fieldwork was over, I kept in touch with some of my key contacts in both countries and continued to ask clarifying questions when needed.

For micro-level original data collection in each site, I started with a focus group

[171] Cynthia E. Milton, "At the Edge of the Peruvian Truth Commission: Alternative Paths to Recounting the Past," *Radical History Review* 2007, no. 98 (2007): 3–33.

to explore the conflict-related themes that are of relevance to the locals and tailor my questions to the context. Focus groups are very instrumental in canvassing a broad range of experiences in a population as interactive group conversations bring a comprehensive array of opinions, experiences, attitudes, and context-specific incidences to light. Finally, focus groups helped me recruit interviewees. Some participants had a unique source of information or would tell a narrative that is disconfirming my theory. In such cases, in order to probe,[172] I would ask for a follow-up interview. Sometimes, after one focus group, I would start in-depth interviews, and then organize another focus group. Sometimes, if I need more collective information, I would conduct more focus groups before interviewing people on one-on-one basis.

I focused on the period between 1980 and 1999. The year 2000 saw the political conjuncture change significantly in both countries. In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori resigned in 2000. The era between 1992 and 2000 coincides with the rise of Fujimori and saw the concoction of a memory of victory and glory, extending from the times when Sendero posed the highest risk to Peru between 1989 and 1992. In Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK, was captured in 1999, and the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002. The power balance within domestic politics and vis-à-vis the PKK changed a lot following the imprisonment of Öcalan. Armed struggle paused between 1999 and 2004 and resumed more fiercely afterwards. Even though beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of the society continue to change, the first

[172] Probing may be needed when a participant utters words about a potentially significant and or sensitive issue in an ambiguous fashion. If the researcher catches a cue in what a participant says or how he or she says it, the researcher may want to know more about what is referred to or the participant's underlying thoughts. Hence, researchers may use the probing technique and gently ask further questions.

stretch of the PKK's guerilla war (1984–1999) established the major elements of the overarching discourse that has carried over to today.

B2. Coding

My observational unit of analysis (data category) is individual and the explanatory unit (theoretical category) is the social groups [173]. The narratives I worked with were subjective; they represented social processes as interpreted by my respondents and hence were buried in the collective social memories. Bearing the aspect of subjectivity in mind, when I was coding, I made sure to underpin the subjective interpretations and sources of contradictions in points of view. In a similar vein, I took the context-specific discursive practices and social processes into account for accurate meaning-making.

I had all my interviews and focus groups transcribed and uploaded them in N-vivo qualitative analysis software for coding and analysis. Coding in qualitative research denotes "the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data" [174]. A code, then, is "a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data".[175] Coding is a data reduction exercise as well as a strong analytical tool for systematic analysis.[176] It is, however, very much an interpretive act. I

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[173] see Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014) for the distinction between the two.
[174] Matthew B. Miles and Michael A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook* (London: Sage, 1994), 10.
[175] Johnny Saldaña, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (London: Sage, 2009), 3.
[176] Saldaña, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*.

used a systematic and iterative coding method common to qualitative analysis.[177] I started out with a deductive set of codes, read the transcripts and field notes line by line, and coded the data in appropriate code(s). I generated new codes as they emerge from the data (See Table A 7 for examples).

In order to diminish subjectivity, I did my coding in cycles. I spent about 15 months in coding and analysis, and I revisited the data three times with at least a three-month interval between each time. When I revisited the data, I recoded, looked for new categories, and reorganized my old themes. I consulted with my key informants in the sites to check the accuracy and meaning of my interpretations to increase the internal reliability of my analysis.

[177] Kathy Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006).

SECTION C. FIGURES AND TABLES FOR THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS PART



Figure A 1. Global Distribution of Political and Social Trust (1995-1998)

Note: The figure is drawn using the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2017). Country-level trust data in the dataset comes from part of the fourth wave (1995-1998) of World Values Survey data. The y-axis indicates social trust while the x-axis shows political trust. In order to fit the country names as markets and to avoid overlaps, some countries are omitted from the figure. (The list of countries omitted: Armenia, Lithuania, South Korea, Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Uruguay, Georgia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary). The scale of the axes is different in order to maximize the plot space for accommodation of higher number of countries.

Figure A 2. Fieldwork sites and Hot Zones of Conflict in Peru
Note: This map of Peru is produced with Tableau 2021.1 (©2022 Mapbox ©OpenstreetMap). Provinces circled with red oval are where I conducted my fieldwork. The geographic area colored with red indicates the main theatres of operation where the Shining Path rebels were most active based on data on fatalities from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.[178] Although clashes also occurred in other areas, the marked provinces constitute the hot zones of clashes and attacks.

[178] TRC, "Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report" (Lima, Peru, 2004), http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/.

Figure A 3. Fieldwork sites and Hot Zones of Conflict in Turkey
Note: This map of Turkey is produced with Tableau 2021.1 (©2022 Mapbox ©OpenstreetMap). Provinces circled with red oval are where I conducted my fieldwork. The geographic area colored with red indicates the main theatres of operation where the PKK rebels and Turkish army most often clashed based on data from the total average number of clashes and deaths reported over the years (1983-2012) as well as areas under emergency rule.[179] The marked provinces constitute the hot clash zones.

[179] Ceren Belge, "Civilian victimization and the politics of information in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey," *World Politics* 68, no. 2 (2016): 285–86.

Table A 1. Total Number of Deaths in the Civil Wars of Turkey and Peru

	Turkey (1984-2012)*	Peru (1980-2000)+
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS	35,576	69,280
Security Forces	2, 375	1,054 (Armed Forces) 682 (Police Forces)
Assassinations (Civil Servants in Turkey, Local Authorities and Union Leaders in Peru)	5,543	2,267
Guerrillas	22,101	65,277
Civilians	5,557	(Civilians+Guerillas)

* Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Commission
+The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru—Final Report. The numbers are for both Sendero and MRTA (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) conflicts. The commission concluded that Sendero was responsible from 54% of the total deaths and disappearances, MRTA of 1.5%, and the rest was perpetrated by the state security forces. Disaggregated figures by the listed categories are not readily available in the report. Especially the civilian and guerrilla figures are almost impossible to disaggregate due to their indistinguishability.

Table A 2. Details of Fieldwork and Data Collection in Peru

Field Sites	Dates	Number of Interviews with Ordinary People		Number of Expert Interviews	Focus Groups
		Women	Men		
Lima	September 5-November 15, 2013 February 5-February 20, 2014	10	12	12	6
Arequipa	October 25-30, 2013	2	6	3	0
Iquitos	November 15-30, 2013	2	3	0	3
Cusco	December 1-30, 2013	6	8	6	3
Cajamarca	January 1-13, 2014	2	3	5	3
Ayaucho	January 13-February 5, 2014	8	4	10	2
Tarapoto	February 10-15, 2014				2
Total		30	36	36	19

Table A 3. Details of Focus Groups in Peru

Adults (above 28)			**Youth (18-28)**
Men	Women	Mixed	Mixed
Lima (1) Cusco (1) Cajamarca (1) Tarapoto (1) Iquitos (1) Ayacucho (1)	Lima (1) Cusco (1) Cajamarca (1) Tarapoto (1) Iquitos (1) Ayacucho (1)	Lima (2)	Lima (2) Cusco (1) Cajamarca (1) Iquitos (1)

Table A 4. Details of Fieldwork and Data Collection in Turkey

Field Sites	Dates	Number of Interviews with Ordinary People		Number of Expert Interviews	Focus Groups
		Women	Men		
Ankara	March 25-April 2014	7	8	8 +6 (in 2012)	4
Gaziantep	April 20-May 13	3	7	0	2
Mersin	May 13-20	3	9	4	0
Şanlıurfa	May 20-24	6	7	8	3
Mardin	May 24-30	4	6	8	0
Diyarbakır	June 1-15	8	12	10	3
İstanbul	June 20- July 5	5	7	8 +6 (in 2012)	3
Total		36	56		

Table A 5. Details of Focus Groups in Turkey

	Adults (above 28)			Youth (18-28)
	Men	**Women**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**
Kurds	Şanlıurfa (1)	Diyarbakır (1) İstanbul (1) Şanlıurfa (1)		
Turks		Ankara (1)	Gaziantep (1) İstanbul (1) Diyarbakır (1)	Ankara (1) Gaziantep (1) Istanbul (1)
Mixed	Diyarbakır (1)	Ankara (1)	Ankara (1)	Şanlıurfa (1)

Table A 6. Detailed Profiles of Interview Participants in Turkey

	Men	Women
Kurds	Diyarbakır (8)	Diyarbakır (4)
	Ankara (3)	Ankara (2)
	İstanbul (3)	İstanbul (2)
	Mardin (3)	Mardin (2)
	Şanlıurfa (7)	Şanlıurfa (6)
	Gaziantep (3)	Mersin (3)
	Mersin(6)	
Turks	Diyarbakır (4)	Diyarbakır (4)
	Ankara (5)	Ankara (5)
	İstanbul (4)	İstanbul (3)
	Mardin (3)	Mardin (2)
	Gaziantep (4)	Gaziantep (3)
	Mersin (3)	

Table A 7. Samples of Qualitative Data Coding

Coded as:	Examples of Interview/Focus Group comments
Perceived personal threat Perceived sociotropic threat	*The truth is that there was no security at that time. It was as much because of Sendero as the police. […] If you happen to be in a marked village, you were a suspect. […] You did not know what could happen to you at any time* (Male, Adult Men Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 15, 2014). *Concessions may be necessary but our red line is our borders; PKK is after our land but no compromise is possible on territorial integrity* (Male focus group, Gaziantep, May 11, 2014). *The feeling between '85 and '90 was that nobody knew what was going to happen. The country did not seem viable any longer; it did not seem like it had a future* (Men Focus Group, Lima, October 20, 2013).
Anger response Fear response	*We get angry hearing people speak Kurdish on the bus. I can't tolerate it* (Women Focus Group, Ankara, April 9, 2014). *I find it difficult to work under a Kurdish boss. I cannot express my views when there is trouble at work. She [the boss] is very prejudicial and critical towards the very own people of the city she is making a living of while we cannot even open our mouth. I feel excluded in my own country. It is really frustrating* (Female, Gaziantep, May 14, 2014). *We are a community here, and we were all affected – it was not just the peasants. […] The vulnerability of being a human was very much felt at that time. What could a violated nurse supposed to do? The teachers were not able to teach their classes; they would eventually disappear because of fear. The situation was bad for the whole world, all of us* (Men Focus Group, Cusco, January, 21, 2014).
Salience of ethnicity	*When I was in high school [late 1990s], on days when we lost considerable number of soldiers, the police would block entry to Kurdish neighbourhoods as there were instances of taking revenge by attacking them. Their crime is to be a co-ethnic with the terrorists* (Mixed Focus Group, Ankara, April 12, 2014).
Outgroup distinction (us vs. them)	*We gave them the right to have their TV channels, they can elect Kurdish mayors they can listen to their music. They can do it all* (Youth Focus Group, Ankara, April 15 2014). *Although I was able to blend in well in the university, as half of my classmates were Kurdish, once I became a professional, they make you feel that you are different. Once I was working with a judge, and he asked me where I am from. I said Şırnak, and he said 'I can tell from your accent'. They make sure you know you are not one of them [Turks]* (Interview #E3, Diyarbakir, June 15,

	2014).
Out-group distrust Generalized trust/distrust	*I don't even shop at stores if I know that the owner is Kurdish. I don't know where my money goes. They send every penny to PKK for I all know* (Interview #17, Female, Gaziantep, May 12, 2014). *I don't believe in the good intentions of Kurds. That they just want recognition is a pure fiction. Their goal has always been secession, and I find them to ingrate* (Mixed Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 9, 2014).

Table A 8.Top Ten Most Used Words in the Interviews and Focus Groups in Peru

Word	Length	Count	Weighted Percentage
Estado [state]	6	802	0.38%
Violencia [violence]	9	754	0.36%
Lima [Lima-capital city]	4	751	0.36%
Sendero [Shining Path]	7	715	0.34%
Gobierno [Government]	8	707	0.34%
Perú	4	600	0.29%
Peligro [danger]	7	587	0.28%
Fujimori [name of the president in 1990-2000]	8	554	0.26%
Terrorismo [terrorism]	10	541	0.26%
Miedo [fear]	5	530	0.25%

Note: This table is produced using the 'word frequency' query function of Nvivo 12. Minimum word length is set to 3 characters. I exclude conjunctive words from the list. Weighted Percentage is the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted.

Table A 9.Top Ten Most Used Words in the Interviews and Focus Groups in Turkey

Word	Length	Count	Weighted Percentage	Similar Words
Kürt [Kurdish]	7	951	0.69%	Kürt, Kürt'le, Kürtler
Bizim[Our(s)]	5	356	0.26%	bizim
Türk[Turkish]	4	230	0.17%	Türk, Türk'sünüz, Türk'ün
Onlar [Them]	5	222	0.16%	onlar
Devlet [State]	9	177	0.13%	devletin, devletine
Bütünlük [Integrity]	5	172	0.12%	bütünlük
Türkiye [Turkey]	10	161	0.12%	Türkiye, Türkiyeli, Türkiye'de, Türkiye'deki, Türkiye'nin, Türkiye'ye, Türkiye'yi
Şehit [Martry]	5	152	0.11%	şehit
Siyasal [Political]	7	124	0.18%	Siyasal, siyasi
Polis [Police]	5	119	0.09	polis

Note: This table is produced using the 'word frequency' query function of Nvivo 12. Minimum word length is set to 3 characters. I exclude conjunctive words from the list. Weighted Percentage is the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted.

SECTION D. INTERVIEW GUIDES

D1. Interview Guide for Turkey

GETTING TO KNOW THE RESPONDENT

- Where were you born?
    - If not in Turkey, since when do you live in Turkey?
    - Probe whether Kurdish or not.
- Where did you live in Turkey?
    - Probe if there is any migration story.
- Where did you go to school?
- What is the highest level of education you and your parents get?

PREWAR TIMES

Now, I would like to ask some questions about the past.

- How were your neighbourhood relationships when you were growing up?
- How was the general social context like in the pre-1980?
- Would you know people's ethnic/racial/religious backgrounds?
- Did you talk about politics in your family when you were a kid?
- How about your adult life? Was politics an important component of your life? Did you talk about politics at work?
- Do you remember the governments? The big political events of the time?
- What did you think of the Turkish state? Were you proud to be Turkish?
- What did Turkish flag mean to you?
- Do you remember Ozal government in 1980? What did you think about the return to the civilian rule?

POSTWAR TIMES

- Where were you living when the PKK first began guerilla war? (in 1980)
- Did you hear about the attacks?
    - If yes, tell me about it. (Use probe questions below if need be)
        - What did you think about it when it first began?
        - Did you consider it serious?
        - Did it affect your life then?
- What do you think about government's response to the insurgency when it first began?

- Do you remember a specific incident in the 1980s or the 1990s that particularly affected you or your family?
- Do you think there was support for the PKK?
    - Did you support their ideology and demands?
- What do you think about 'state of emergency' declaration in the Eastern provinces, and military's actions in those regions (Hakkari, Van, Tunceli)? (adjust the question to the region/province)
    - How do you think they performed in managing the conflict?
    - Did you support their actions?
    - Do you think it was right to employ violence against in response to violent attacks by the PKK?
- Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances killed by the military/ government/ PKK?
    - How did you feel about it?
    - Did you take any action in response?
- Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances disappeared during the conflict?
    - When and through which channel did you learn that he/she was "disappeared"? Was it through the advocacy organization, government officials or the press?
    - Who do you think was responsible?
- How did these developments affect your life?
    - Did you talk about the situation with your family, social circle, co-workers?
    - Has there been any change in your life? How was your daily life then?
    - Probe in to see whether there has been any change in his/her friendship circles, or relationship with neighbours?
    - Did it change anything in your political involvement?
    - Were you worried? Did you feel threatened?
        - If yes, what was your main worry?
        - Probe to look for perception of collective vs. personal threat
- How did you perceive government's performance in its counterinsurgency?
- Did you feel any sympathy towards the PKK?
- Was the state right in its response? How else could the situation be handled?
- Did you feel protected in the 1990s?
- Was the state the righteous authority for you, after the war started?
- How did you perceive your role in the conflict?
- How strong do you think Turkish state is?

DISPLACED POPULATIONS

- What do you think of the internal migration?
- How did the city/locality change after the wave of migration?

- How do you see/evaluate the impact of these migrants in your community?
    - Probe in for damages/contributions
- Do you mind having one of them as your neighbours?
- Do you care about the owners of businesses?
    - Probe in to see if he discriminates against Kurds/Turks
- Would you care if your daughter/son marries a Kurdish/Turkish spouse?
- What do you think about Kurdish language rights?

POST-2000

- What do you think about Erdogan?
- What do you think about e-coup?
    - Do you think accumulation of power in one hand was useful as compared to a coalition structure?
- How do you think Erdogan was in managing the conflict situation?
    - Try to probe in to understand whether the respondent can differentiate government and state.
- Have you ever considered moving elsewhere?
- What did you think/feel when you heard about the capture of Öcalan?
    - Did you think it was over?
    - Did it feel safer to live in Turkey?
    - Did it increase your trust in government?
- How did you feel when PKK was back after a cease-fire promise?
    - Probe in to see whether he/she felt hopeless, wasn't able to see the end, was very afraid?
    - Did you feel protected enough by the government?
- Did you have the same opinion for the PKK from the very beginning? Or did the developments alter your evaluation/perception?

CURRENT SITUATION

- Do you think violence is over?
- Do you participate in politics? (Vote, membership in parties, demonstrations, etc…)
- Tell me what you think about current Peruvian politics.
    - Probe in to understand his/her trust in parties, parliament and government.

D2. Interview Guide for Peru

GETTING TO KNOW THE RESPONDENT

- Where were you born?
    - If not in Peru, since when do you live in Peru?
    - Probe whether indigenous or not.
- Where did you live in Peru?
    - Probe if there is any migration story.
- Where did you go to school?
- What is the highest level of education you and your parents get?

PREWAR TIMES

Now, I would like to ask some questions about the past.

- How were your neighbourhood relationships when you were growing up?
- How was the general social context like in the pre-1980?
- Would you know people's ethnic/racial/religious backgrounds?
- Did you talk about politics in your family when you were a kid?
- How about your adult life? Was politics an important component of your life? Did you talk about politics at work?
- Do you remember the governments? The big political events of the time?
- What did you think of the Peruvian state? Were you proud to be Peruvian?
- What did Peruvian flag mean to you?
- Do you remember Belaúnde government in 1980? What did you think about the return to the civilian rule?

POSTWAR TIMES

- Where were you living when Shining Path first began guerilla war? (in 1980)
- Did you hear about the attacks?
    - If yes, tell me about it. (Use probe questions below if need be)
        - What did you think about it when it first began?
        - Did you consider it serious?
        - Did it affect your life then?
- What do you think about government's response to the insurgency when it first began?
- Do you remember a specific incident in the 1980s or the 1990s that particularly affected you or your family? (emotionally, psychologically, etc.)
- Do you think there was support for Shining Path? Did you support Shining Path's ideology?

- How strong do you think the Peruvian state was in the 1980s?
- What do you think about state of emergency declaration, and military's actions in those regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac)?
    - How do you think they performed in managing the conflict?
    - Did you support their actions?
    - Do you think it was right to employ violence against in response to violent attacks by Shining Path?
- What do you think about rondas?
    - Were they successful?
    - How you think their actions affected the course of conflict?
    - Did you know any rondas?
    - Did you trust them?
- Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances killed by the military/ government/ Shining Path?
    - How did you feel about it?
    - Did you take any action in response?
- Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances disappeared during the conflict?
    - When and through which channel did you learn that he/she was "disappeared"?
    - Who do you think was responsible?
- How did the war-related developments affect your life?
    - Did you talk about the situation with your family, social circle, co-workers?
    - Has there been any change in your life? How was daily life?
    - Probe in to see whether there has been any change in his/her friendship circles, or relationship with neighbours?
    - Did it change anything in your political involvement?
    - Were you worried?
        - If yes, what was your main worry?
        - Probe to look for perception of collective vs. personal threat
- Did you trust in the state for providing security? Was there enough police/security force?
- What kind of protective measures did you take?
        - Probe in to see trust in the security forces
- What do you think about Fujimori?
- What do you think about autogolpe?
    - Do you think accumulation of power in one hand was useful as compared to a more democratic structure?
- How do you think Fujimori do in managing the conflict situation?
    - Try to probe in to understand whether the respondent can differentiate government and state.

- How did you feel during the 1990s when Shining Path had expanded into cities, and when it was more powerful?
    - Probe in to see whether he/she felt hopeless, wasn't able to see the end, was very afraid?
    - Did you feel protected enough by the government?
- Have you ever considered moving elsewhere?
- Did you have the same opinion for Shining Path from the very beginning? Or did the developments alter your evaluation/perception?

- What did you think/feel when you heard about the capture of Gúzman?
    - Have you EVER heard of Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
        - If yes, what do you think about its findings?
        - Do you think that the Commission Report satisfied your expectations? What was the best aspect about it? The worst?
        - What do you think is the best way for a society to come to terms with a violent past?

DISPLACED POPULATIONS

- What do you think of the internal migration?
- How did the city/locality change after the wave of migration?
- How do you see/evaluate the impact of these migrants in your community?
    - Probe in for damages/contributions
- Do you mind having one of them as your neighbours?
- Do you care about the owners of businesses?
    - Probe in to see if he discriminates against indigenous peoples
- Would you care if your daughter/son marries someone from the Sierra/indigenous person?

CURRENT SITUATION

- Do you think violence is over?
- Do you participate in politics? (Vote, membership in parties, demonstrations, etc…)
- Tell me what you think about current Peruvian politics.
    - What do you think about current parties?
    - Probe in to understand his/her trust in parties, parliament and government.

SECTION E. Additional Materials for the Quantitative Analysis

Country-level Control Variables

There are many aggregate factors that affect social trust in a country such as ethnic fractionalization, income inequality, level of democracy, or Protestanism; yet, because the dependent variable is a latent measure itself estimated with these very factors, I avoided adding all these variables to the right side of the equation as independent variables to avoid misspecification. I control for the following variables that may affect baseline social trust and changes thereof: *political corruption,*[180] presence of *interstate war,*[181] *GDP per capita*, *polity score*, *ethnic fractionalization*, and *war history*. The summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table E 1.

Political Corruption: This variable is an index variable constructed by averaging four indexes that taps corruption in the public sector, executive, legislative and judicial branches. These measures are from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, and called 'vdem_corr.' [182]

Interstate War: This variable is a binary indicator of country's involvement in an interstate war in a given year. The source is the QoG dataset,[183] and the indicator measures the magnitude score of episode(s) of international warfare, and is named 'cspv_intwar.' I used this indicator to create a binary 'presence' variable for interstate war.

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[180] e.g. Bo Rothstein and Daniel Eek, "Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach," *Rationality and Society* 21, no. 1 (2009): 81–112.
[181] e.g. Michael P. Jasinski, "The Social Trust Theory of International Conflict," in *Social Trust, Anarchy, and International Conflict*, ed. Michael P. Jasinski (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011), 77–89.
[182] see Jan Teorell et al., "The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, Version Jan21. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.," 2021, 531, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/qogstdjan21.
[183] The QoG dataset's source for this variable is the Systemic Peace dataset.

GDP per capita is the most common proxy in the civil war literature for state strength and seems to predict conflict onset consistently (Lacina 2006; Sambanis 2001). I used Real GDP per capita measured by Maddison Historical Statistics, included in the QoG dataset, named 'mad_gdppc', and it is logged in the models.

Polity score reflects the difference between the autocracy score assigned to a country and the democracy score. I use the revised combined polity score included in the QoG dataset, named 'p_polity2'.

Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability of two randomly selected people belonging to different ethnic groups. The measure is developed by James Fearon and is included in the QoG dataset under the name 'fe_ethfra'.

War history shows the count of number of conflict onsets the country has previously experienced. It comes from the GROW^{up} dataset and is named 'warhist'.

Table A 10. Descriptive Statistics

	1948-2009 Dataset with Latent Trust Measure			1980-2019 Dataset with WVS trust				
Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Latent trust	7,170	0.453	0.226				0	1
WVS trust				320	0.286	0.162		
Ethnic terr. war	7,170	0.065		320	0.1		0	1
Ethnic gov. war	7,170	0.03		320	0.022		0	1
Nonethnic terr. war	7,170	0.009		320	0.009		0	1
Nonethnic gov. war	7,170	0.072		320	0.063		0	1
Political corruption	7,170	0.498	0.3	320	0.385	0.306	0	1
Interstate war	7,170	0.04	0.197	320	0.016	0.124	0	1
Real GDP pc (logged)	7,170	8.496	1.107	320	9.522	0.898	6.842	11.245
Polity score	7,170	0.759	7.418	320	6.363	5.259	-10	10
Ethnic fractionalization	7,170	0.456	0.263	320	0.357	0.230	0	1
War history	7,170	.996	1.864	320	1.465	2.572	0	20

Note: Variables without standard deviation are binary, and the means for these variables refer to proportion of positive cases in the data. For example, 6.5% of all the country-year observations had ethnic territorial war.

Table A 11. Civil Wars and Trust Models- Full Output

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Latent trust	Latent trust	Latent trust	WVS trust	WVS trust
Latent trust lagged (one year)	0.844***	0.724***			
	(0.013)	(0.020)			
Latent trust lagged (five years)			0.527***		
			(0.008)		
Ethnic territorial war	0.005	0.004			
	(0.005)	(0.005)			
Ethnic governmental war	-0.003	-0.008			
	(0.005)	(0.006)			
Nonethnic territorial war	-0.003	-0.005			
	(0.007)	(0.007)			
Nonethnic governmental war	**-0.011***	**-0.008+**			
	(0.004)	**(0.004)**			
Ethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.002		
			(0.003)		
Ethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			-0.001		
			(0.005)		
Nonethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.008		
			(0.008)		
Nonethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			**-0.007***		
			(0.003)		
Ethnic terr. lagged (8 years)				0.000	0.011
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Ethnic gov. lagged (8 year)				-0.015	-0.021
				(0.043)	(0.050)
Nonethnic terr. lagged (8 years)				-0.009	0.023

				(0.042)	(0.048)
Nonethnic gov. lagged (8 years)				**-0.058***	**-0.049***
				(0.025)	**(0.024)**
Political corruption index		0.016	-0.071***		-0.183***
		(0.015)	(0.004)		(0.047)
Interstate war		-0.008**	-0.012**		0.063
		(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.039)
Real GDP per capita		0.014**	0.030***		0.009
		(0.005)	(0.001)		(0.012)
Polity score		0.004***	0.009***		-0.005**
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.002)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.000	-0.019***		-0.137*
		(.)	(0.003)		(0.055)
Timetrend	0.001***	0.000***			
	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Constant	0.052***	-0.020	0.005	0.267***	0.341**
	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.126)
	(1) Latent trust	(2) Latent trust	(3) Latent trust	(4) WVS trust	(5) WVS trust
Random Effects Parameters					
Var(country-year)				-1.976***	-2.153***
				(0.076)	(0.083)
Var(country)				-2.879	-2.862
				(30.335)	(21.633)
Var(Residual)				-3.452	-3.506
				(95.334)	(78.397)
N(country-year)	8225	6958	6642	316	301

N(country)	169	146	145	102	97
Estimator	Arellano-Bond (linear dynamic panel-data estimator)	Arellano-Bond (linear dynamic panel-data estimator)	Generalized least squares (GLS)	Ordinary least squares (OLS) (Multilevel Mixed effects)	Ordinary least squares (OLS) (Multilevel Mixed effects)

Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001

Table A 12.Robustness Checks for the Civil War and Trust Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)
DV:	Latent Trust Variable					WVS Trust measure	
Latent trust lagged (one year)	0.721***	0.855***					
	(0.020)	(0.005)					
Latent trust lagged (five years)			0.527***				
			(0.008)				
Latent trust lagged (ten years)				0.327***			
				(0.009)			
Latent trust lagged (fifteen years)					0.211***		
					(0.009)		
Ethnic terr. (differenced X(t)-X(t-1))	-0.001						
	(0.004)						
Ethnic gov. (differenced)	0.007*						
	(0.004)						
Nonethnic terr. (differenced)	0.002						
	(0.003)						
Nonethnic gov.(differenced)	**0.009****						
	(0.003)						
Ethnic territorial war		-0.002					
		(0.003)					
Ethnic governmental war		-0.005+					
		(0.003)					
Nonethnic territorial war		-0.002					
		(0.005)					
Nonethnic governmental war		**-0.007*****					
		(0.002)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)

DV:			Latent Trust Variable			WVS Trust Measure	
Ethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.001				
			(0.003)				
Ethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			-0.001				
			(0.005)				
Nonethnic terr. lagged (5 years)			-0.008				
			(0.008)				
Nonethnic gov. lagged (5 years)			**-0.007***				
			(0.003)				
Ethnic terr. lagged (10 years)				0.003		0.022	
				(0.004)		(0.021)	
Ethnic gov. lagged (10 years)				0.010+		-0.086	
				(0.006)		(0.054)	
Nonethnic terr. lagged (10 years)				-0.001		0.042	
				(0.009)		(0.044)	
Nonethnic gov. lagged (10 years)				**-0.012*****		**-0.073****	
				(0.004)		**(0.023)**	
Ethnic terr. lagged (15 years)					0.001		0.047*
					(0.004)		(0.021)
Ethnic gov. lagged (15 years)					0.004		-0.100*
					(0.007)		(0.048)
Nonethnic terr. lagged (15 years)					0.004		-0.025
					(0.010)		(0.051)
Nonethnic gov. lagged (15 years)					**-0.029*****		**-0.045***
					(0.004)		**(0.023)**
Political corruption index	0.020	-0.020***	-0.071***	-0.102***	-0.118***	-0.191***	-0.189***
	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Interstate war	-0.008**	-0.007**	-0.011**	-0.012**	-0.019***	0.063	0.069+
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.039)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)

DV:	Latent Trust Variable					WVS Trust Measure	
Real GDP per capita	0.017***	0.009***	0.030***	0.043***	0.050***	0.006	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Polity score	0.004***	0.003***	0.009***	0.012***	0.014***	-0.005**	-0.005**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ethnic fractionalization		-0.008***	-0.019***	-0.023***	-0.026***	-0.149**	-0.129*
		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.055)	(0.056)
War history	-0.003+	0.000	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Timetrend	0.000***						
	(0.000)						
Constant	0.058***	0.001	0.004	0.007	0.013	0.374**	0.382**
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Random Effects Parameters							
Var(country-year)						-2.177***	-2.144***
						(0.085)	(0.085)
Var(country)						-2.870	-2.892
						(20.543)	(17.459)
Var(Residual)						-3.520	-3.527
						(75.335)	(62.118)
N(country-year)	7842	7113	6642	5966	5285	296	292
N(country)	165	146	145	145	145	97	97
Estimator	Arellano-Bond	GLS	GLS	GLS	GLS	OLS (Multilevel mixed)	OLS (Multilevel mixed)

Standard errors in parentheses. In Models 2-5, Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression is used. GLS is generalized least squares, OLS is Ordinary Least Squares. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.010 *** p<0.001